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Abstract
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have emerged as a new application scenario that
is envisioned to revolutionize the human driving experiences, optimize traffic flow control
systems, etc. Addressing security and privacy issues as the prerequisite of VANETs’ devel-
opment must be emphasized. To avoid any possible malicious attack and resource abuse,
employing a digital signature scheme is widely recognized as the most effective approach
for VANETs to achieve authentication, integrity, and validity. However, when the number
of signatures received by a vehicle becomes large, a scalability problem emerges immedi-
ately, where a vehicle could be difficult to sequentially verify each received signature within
100-300 ms interval in accordance with the current Dedicated Short Range Communications
(DSRC) [1] protocol. In addition, there are still some unsolved attacks in VANETs such as
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which are not well addressed and waiting for us to solve.
In this thesis, we propose the following solutions to address the above mentioned security
related issues.
First of all, to address the scalability issues, we introduce a novel roadside unit (RSU)
aided message authentication scheme, named RAISE, which makes RSUs responsible for
verifying the authenticity of messages sent from vehicles and for notifying the results back
to vehicles. In addition, RAISE adopts the k-anonymity property for preserving user privacy,
where a message cannot be associated with a common vehicle.
Secondly, we further consider the situation that RSUs may not cover all the busy streets
of a city or a highway in some situations, for example, at the beginning of a VANETs’
deployment period, or due to the physical damage of some RSUs, or simply for economic
considerations. Under these circumstances, we further propose an efficient identity-based
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batch signature verification scheme for vehicular communications. The proposed scheme
can make vehicles verify a batch of signatures once instead of one after another, and thus it
efficiently increases vehicles’ message verification speed. In addition, our scheme achieves
conditional privacy: a distinct pseudo identity is generated along with each message, and a
trust authority can trace a vehicle’s real identity from its pseudo identity. In order to find
invalid signatures in a batch of signatures, we adopt group testing technique which can find
invalid signatures efficiently.
Lastly, we identify a DoS attack, called signature jamming attack (SJA), which could
easily happen and possibly cause a profound vicious impact on the normal operations of a
VANET, yet has not been well addressed in the literature. The SJA can be simply launched
at an attacker by flooding a significant number of messages with invalid signatures that jam
the surrounding vehicles and prevent them from timely verifying regular and legitimate mes-
sages. To countermeasure the SJA, we introduces a hash-based puzzle scheme, which serves
as a light-weight filter for excluding likely false signatures before they go through relatively
lengthy signature verification process. To further minimize the vicious effect of SJA, we
introduce a hash recommendation mechanism, which enables vehicles to share their infor-
mation so as to more efficiently thwart the SJA.
For each research solution, detailed analysis in terms of computational time, and trans-
mission overhead, privacy preservation are performed to validate the efficiency and effective-
ness of the proposed schemes.
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According to Traffic Safety Facts Annual Report [2] from the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, nearly 6 million police-reported motor vehicle crashes occurred in the
United States alone in 2006, leading to 1.75 million injuries and 38,588 deaths. According
to the 2006 Annual Report on Traffic Congestion in the Denver Region [3], each resident
on average faces about 32 hours of congestion delay per year. Travel during rush hours
takes 27% longer than non-rush hours. $1.7 billion per year is lost due to the traffic delays.
The above numbers indicate that the traditional traffic crash alert and traffic control systems
should be meliorated in order to improve the quality of the public transportation. Fortunately,
wireless communication communities and car manufactures are gearing up to develop new
technologies to make cars smarter [4]. Vehicles and roadside infrastructure are equipped
with wireless communication devices and constitute a vehicular ad hoc network (VANET).
VANET aims at improving the road safety and avoid potential traffic accidents. It has also
been envisioned to improve driving experiences by providing Internet services to the drivers
and passengers and supporting possible e-commerce activities.
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Figure 1.1: The system model
1.1.1 Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
Fig. 1.1 shows the system model of a VANET. A VANET is composed of vehicles and
roadside infrastructure units (RSUs). Vehicles are equipped with wireless communication
devices, which are called On-Board Units (OBUs). The wireless communication devices
enable vehicles to exchange traffic related information with each other and with RSUs.
Both vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) com-
munication rely on the IEEE 802.11p media access control protocol [5]. RSUs are not neces-
sarily connected directly. They could be indirectly connected via a wired backbone network
or the Internet. The backbone network or the Internet could also connect RSUs with some
application servers that provide particular services for drivers on the road.
As a new type of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), a VANET possesses a number of
unique features compared with a MANET. The unique features are presented as follows.
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• No power constraint: Unlike laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), or sensors in
mobile or sensor networks, vehicles are not subject to power constraint. Thus, power
constraints are not considered in this research.
• High mobility: The speed of vehicles in cities ranges from 0 to 60 km/h and can reach
up to 120 km/h on highway. In addition, unlike MANETs, the mobility of vehicles is
not random. Instead it is in accordance with road directions.
• Highly dynamic topology: Due to the fast mobility of vehicles, VANETs have a highly
dynamic topology. However, for vehicles driving on the same direction, their relative
positions change slowly.
• High density: The density of vehicles could be very high at some locations such as
intersections or highways where there are traffic jams.
• Additional information: Sensors equipped by vehicles can collect environmental infor-
mation such as road surface temperatures, emergent braking, and vehicle speeds. Thus,
more promising applications could be explored by taking advantage of VANETs.
• Roadside unit assistance: There are Roadside units (RSUs)located at important loca-
tions, such as intersections and exits of highways, to broadcast critical information for
drivers. Compared with vehicles, RSUs are stationary and have higher computational
power.
Some of these unique features in VANETs may assist us in designing security-related
schemes. We integrate some of these features into our designs that will be shown in the
following sections.
1.1.2 VANET Applications
The applications of vehicular networks are classified into two categories: safety-related and
infotainment-related applications. The safety-related application is the main objective of
3
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VANET , which is expected to improve the driving safety. According to the safety natures,
the safety-related messages are further categorized into three groups: warning messages,
assisting messages, informing messages.
• Warning messages: Both RSUs and vehicles can send warning messages. For example
in the scenario I of Fig. 1.2, two running vehicles are approaching towards a sharp-turn
intersection. RSU broadcasts warning messages to alert coming vehicles to be aware
of the sharp turn and slow down. Another example is shown in the scenario III of
Fig. 1.2, two vehicles are running on the road with a high speed, and the front vehicle
suddenly makes a emergent brake. The front vehicle immediately broadcasts the brake
alert message to its neighbors. Therefore, drivers in following vehicles can notice the
emergent brake in time and might avoid a potential collision.
• Assisting messages: Vehicles send assisting messages when potential collision would
happen. For example, when the inter-vehicle distance of two vehicles is too short, an
assisting alert message will be sent by the front car to the next car. The driver in the
next car could choose to slow down or change lanes subsequently.
• Informing messages: RSUs will broadcast some informing messages when an abnor-
mal traffic flow occurs. For example, in the scenario II of Fig. 1.2, there is a car
collision, which incurs a serious traffic jam. In this case, RSUs spread the traffic jam
messages to vehicles within certain miles to let them be aware of the traffic jam and
choose other less busy roads if possible. Enlightened by this example, we can take
advantage of VANETs to control traffic flow specially during the rush hour in a city.
In addition, if emergency vehicles such as ambulances, police cars, and fire trucks are
approaching, RSUs could notify the vehicles that are far away from the emergency
vehicles to make way for them in advance.
In addition to providing safety-related applications, VANETs can also provide a bunch




Alert  vehicles to slow down











Alert vehicles to pay attention 
to a sharp brake ahead
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Figure 1.2: VANET Applications
related applications. Some examples are presented below.
• RSUs can assist drivers in finding surrounding interesting places, such as the closest
restaurant, coffee shop, plaza, and gas station. When vehicles encounter an RSU, they
send their requests to the RSU which will then searches its database, and responses
vehicles with their interests. RSUs can also be located at the entrance of a parking lot,
and tell whether the parking lot is full or not. If it is not full, RSUs inside the parking
lot are able to guild the vehicle to find a parking spot [6].
• RSUs can serve as gateways for Internet access. For instance, RSUs are able to assist
vehicles to upload/download mp3 or small-size videos. Passengers in the vehicles can
also send/receive emails, browse web sites, and play online games. These internet
services are transmitted through RSUs.
• RSUs can be used for business purposes. RSUs could help some stores to broadcast ad-
vertisements, such as weekend special offers, weekly flyers, and movie ticket coupons.
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Drivers are able to buy some e-tickets directly from RSUs.
• VANETs can be used to collect the environmental information [7]. The sensors on the
vehicles could be used to collect data such as weather and humidity information. The
data is sent to RSUs, which serve as data collectors.
1.1.3 Dedicated Short Range Communications
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) [1] is a short to medium-range wireless
channels, which is particularly designed for V2I and V2V communication use. In the USA,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocated 75MHz of spectrum in central
band 5.9GHz for DSRC in 1999. In Europe, the European Telecommunications Standard
Institute (ETSI) allocated 30MHz of spectrum in central band 5.9GHz for DSRC in 2008.
Similar activities also undergo in Japan, where 5.8GHz band is used instead. DSRC is ex-
clusively used for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS). The decision to use the high
frequency spectrum in 5GHz range is because it can achieve high data rate transmissions
for long distances even under bad weather conditions, which is suitable for the vehicular
communication environment. The DSRC radio technology is a variant of the IEEE 802.11
technology family, which provides a high data transfer rate of up to 27 Mb/s. The transmis-
sion range of DSRC is adjustable, and the maximum transmission range is up to 1000 meter.
To make DSRC more practical and extendable, IEEE P1609 Working Group have been work-
ing on the standardization of the IEEE 802.11p, which is used in physical and medium access
control layers for DSRC. The IEEE P1609 Trial-Use Standards Suite includes applications,
securities, and management services over DSRC as well.
To make vehicles capable to talk with each other on the road and cooperatively avoid col-
lisions as shown in the scenario III of Fig. 1.2, DSRC requires vehicles periodically broadcast
information such as their position, speed, direction of travel, acceleration/deceleration, etc.
Messages are sent every 100-300 ms. As such, each vehicle is well aware of its driving
environment. Therefore the potential collision or abnormal situations could be alerted and
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probably avoided under the assistance of these frequently broadcasted warning messages.
1.2 Research Motivations and Contributions
1.2.1 Motivations
VANETs provide many promising applications that could tremendously benefit our driving
experience as mentioned above. However, it is a double-edged sword. VANETs raise many
security and privacy concerns at the same time. Malicious cars can take advantage of VANET
and disturb the whole system. For example, a compromised vehicle that forges messages to
masquerade as an emergency vehicle could mislead other vehicles to pull over, slow down,
and yield; a tampered vehicle who masquerades as an RSU could mislead other vehicles to
a particular location and cause traffic jam there; if an attacker keeps jamming a significant
amount of bogus messages into a VANET, normal message reception and verification will
be delayed; the private information such as the driving route of legitimate drivers could be
leaked if an attacker passively eavesdrops the traffic related messages in a certain area.
Clearly, these attacks can cause serious problems and probably lead to traffic accidents.
Therefore, before VANET applications are deployed and put into commercial use, it is im-
perative to design security and privacy mechanisms to guard against those malicious attacks.
Since a VANET is a variant of a MANET, some attacks in VANETs also exist in MANETs.
These attacks can be addressed using the same approaches as employed in MANETs. How-
ever, compared with a MANET, a VANET has unique security and privacy characteristics and
challenges, such as fast authentication, conditional privacy preserving, large scale certificate
revocation, etc. Therefore, traditional security protocols and mechanisms in MANETs are
unsuitable for VANETs any more. This fact motivates us to explore new security protocols
that should be dedicated to VANETs.
The new security protocols should take the efficiency problem into consideration. Firstly,
a traffic related message should be verified as soon as it is received because a delay to ver-
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ify crucial alert messages might cause wrong perception and incur severe road accidents.
Second, the security protocol should not generate too much overhead, i.e., communication
overhead. Due to the high density of vehicles in VANETs, a high communication overhead
may cause wireless channel congestion. Third, a qualified security protocol should be scal-
able. The desired protocol should be capable to authenticate messages in a timely manner
even when the number of vehicles within the communication range is large.
Moreover, a denial of service (DoS) attack ubiquitously exists in any kind of networks,
e.g., MANETs, sensor networks, delay tolerant networks, as well as VANET. DoS in each
network has a different form of expression. A robust VANET security protocol requires that
DoS attack be considered.
1.2.2 Contributions
This thesis is dedicated to developing efficient solutions to address security and privacy issues
in VANETs, including message verification, conditional privacy preservation, and DoS attack
mitigation. The major contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We proposed an RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE, to achieve
fast message authentication and conditional privacy preservation. RAISE taking ad-
vantage of the assistance of RSUs enables a vehicle to verify traffic related messages
very fast, and thus reduce message authentication delay. Meanwhile, RAISE is capable
of tracing the real identities of malicious cars.
• In case of the absence of RSUs, we further proposed an efficient ID-based batch ver-
ification (IBV) scheme for message authentication in VANETs. IBV works as a sup-
plementary approach to RAISE, and does not need the assistance of RSUs. IBV can
achieve the same security and conditional privacy level as RAISE does. In IBV, vehi-
cles verify a batch of signatures once instead of verifying them in a one-by-one manner.
The average authentication delay on a batch of signatures can be dramatically reduced.
8
Chapter 1. Introduction
• We defined a DoS attack which delays normal message authentication in VANETs. We
call it invalid signature jamming attack (SJA). The potential threats of SJA are identi-
fied. To thwart such an attack, an authentication filtering mechanism is proposed, with
which vehicles are able to exclude invalid signatures in the pre-authentication stage be-
fore they start the normal signature verification process. The proposed filtering scheme
has very low verification overhead. It does not produce any real time verification delay
either at the sender side or the receiver side.
1.3 Outline of This Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 first introduces the state-of-the-art research about the security and privacy
preservation issues in VANETs. The general security requirements, existing attacks and
unique security characteristics of VANETs are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 in-
troduces an efficient RSU-aided message authentication scheme (RAISE). Chapter 4 presents
an efficient identity-based batch verification scheme (IBV) in the case of no RSU existing in
VANETs. Group testing technique is adopted to find invalid signatures within a batch of
signatures. Chapter 5 introduces a signature jamming attack (SJA), and employs an authen-




The Security of Vehicular Ad Hoc
Networks
2.1 Introduction
Nowadays, vehicles have been equipped with more and more high-technology devices, e.g.,
GPS navigators, radars, and OBUs. Thanks to wireless technology, these wireless-enabled
devices make vehicles intelligent and be able to “talk” with each other, and thereby form
a self-organized VANET. With the assistance of V2V and V2I communications, potentially
fatal road accidents can be avoided; dangerous driving behaviors can be alerted; city traffic
flows can be optimized; traffic jams can be alleviated.
However, even though VANETs bring tremendous benefits to us, VANETs raise many
research challenges as well. One of these challenges is security concerns. In VANETs,
malicious vehicles may modify or insert fake information in the network, which could incur
life-endangering accidents. In a word, if the security mechanism in VANETs is not carefully
designed, misbehavior and malicious attacks may ruin the original intention of VANETs.
Therefore, prior to putting VANETs into the practice, it is important to have a robust and
efficient security mechanism on board.
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Related researches are listed in Section 2.2. Security threats and requirements in VANET
are described in Section 2.3 and 2.4. 2.5 presents the Security architecture.
2.2 Related Work
Because of the importance of secure communication in VANETs, recently both industry and
academia have paid extensive attentions to addressing security and privacy issues.
US DOT first initiated a Vehicle Safety Communications (VSC) project in 2002. VSC
is conducted to evaluate the safety benefits of VANET applications, develops DSRC testing
system, and evaluates DSRC communication functionalities for potential vehicle safety im-
plementations. The VSC project investigates the DSRC security, and constructs a proposed
security architecture and protocol, supporting message integrity/origin authentication, cor-
rectness, privacy, and robustness under attack. In the security system, hierarchical Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) is presented to ensure the authentication between RSUs and OBUs.
Considering the privacy of OBUs, the VSC project adopts a short-lived anonymous certifi-
cate approach, where a pseudonym is included in a certificate for identification and a new
certificate is periodically updated in a short time. If a comprised vehicle is detected, its cer-
tificate must be revoked by putting the certificate into a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
This revocation approach is inefficient for certificate validity inquiring once the CRL grows
quickly and becomes long.
IEEE working group drafted IEEE 1609.2 [8] standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments - Security Services in 2006. IEEE 1609.2 trial-use standard specifies a range of
security services for use in the WAVE environment. It can be used to protect messages from
attacks such as spoofing, eavesdropping and alteration. Also, with this standard, vehicles
can send encrypted messages to each other or to roadside infrastructures. Nevertheless, as
presented in the last section, the communication overhead caused by the security mechanism
is large. Although this standard mentions the necessity to respect the drivers’ privacy, such
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as not leaking personal, identifying, or linkable information to unauthorized parties, it does
not provide detailed approaches to achieve this privacy requirement.
In addition to the industrial efforts on security architecture design for VANETs, many
researches [9–19] in academic have been conducted to address security and privacy issues. J.
Hubaux et al. [9, 10] first identified security and privacy issues of VANETs by claiming that
an appropriate public key infrastructure must be well devised to protect the transmitted infor-
mation and to do mutual authentication among network entities. To address the privacy issue,
they suggested to rely on temporary pseudonyms to achieve anonymity. To achieve both mes-
sage authentication and anonymity, Raya et al. in [11, 12] proposed that each vehicle should
be pre-loaded with a large number of anonymous public and private key pairs together with
the corresponding public key certificates. All traffic related messages are signed with a pub-
lic key based scheme. To achieve privacy, each public and private key pair is used in a short
life time and a pseudo ID is used in each public key certificate. Moreover, the authors com-
puted a safe time interval, in which each vehicle should change its pseudo ID at least once
so that two consecutive pseudo IDs of the vehicle cannot be linked by an adversary. Clearly,
this scheme to protect privacy is straightforward and efficient. But it requires a large storage
capacity to store these security information in each vehicle. Further more, on the side of a
Trust Authority (TA), it should keep the record of all pseudo IDs and their corresponding key
pairs of all vehicles. This is not only inconvenient for the TA to find the real identity of an
abusing vehicle, but is also inconvenient to manage these pseudo identities.
In order to overcome the weakness of the above issues, Lin et al. in [14] developed a
group signature based scheme. With this scheme, vehicles do not require any identities at all.
All vehicles within the same group share the same public key, while their private keys are
different. When a vehicle receives a signed message, the vehicle verifies it with the group
public key. The verifier only knows whether the signer is a legitimate group member or not,
but the verifier does not know who the signer exactly is. In this way, the identity privacy is
well protected. In case that an dispute happens, TA working as the group manager is capable
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to trace the real identity of the sender by using TA’s secret key. For example, a group member
(as an attacker) broadcasts a malicious bogus message with his/her group private key. Notice
that the signature of the message is valid, but the content is fake. Suppose a neighbor of the
attacker finds out that the message is bogus. The neighbor reports the message along with the
corresponding message signature to TA. The TA using its private key, can compute the private
key of the attacker from the signed signature. Then, by looking up the table in which a private
key maps to a real world identity of a user, eventually TA can trace the real identity of the
attacker. The disadvantage of the group signature based scheme relied in its inefficiency of
revocation. If TA revokes a private key of a vehicle, TA has to update the entire security keys
of the whole group. The key materials of all group members have to be renewed. In addition,
although the group signature based scheme achieves the conditional privacy preservation, the
computational cost of verifying a group signature is high, compared with the traditional PKI
based signature scheme such as ECDSA. Therefore, the group signature based scheme could
result in high message loss ratio under a high traffic density scenario.
Aiming to alleviate the high computational overhead of the group signature based security
scheme, Calandriello et al. [15] introduced a hybrid scheme that integrates the traditional PKI
based scheme and the group signature based scheme. Similar to the above group signature
based scheme, each vehicle is assigned a private key and a group public key. The group
public key is the same for all group members, and each member holds a distinct private
key. Unlike the above scheme of Lin et al. in [14], the private key is not used for signing
messages. Instead, a signer uses the private key to generate temporary public key certificates.
In particular, vehicles generate multiple private key and public key pairs. Each pair has a
public key certificate, which mainly contains a pseudo identity and a lifetime, as well as
a signature. The signature in the certificate is signed using its group private key by each
vehicle itself instead of the trust authority. Here, the lifetime in the certificate indicates how
long the certificate is valid. The lifetime should be short such that an adversary cannot link
two distinct pseudo identities. The temporary public key and private key pairs work the same
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as in [12]. They are used to sign traffic related messages. The revocation process is similar
to the group signature scheme in [14]. In case that a dispute happens, TA can trace the real
identity of the attacker through the public key certificate because the certificate is signed by
vehicles using their group private key. The hybrid scheme makes a tradeoff between the
traditional PKI based scheme and the group signature based scheme. Although the hybrid
scheme has less computational overhead than the group signature based scheme, it still has
higher computation overhead than the traditional PKI based scheme. Therefore, this hybrid
scheme cannot address our scalability issues.
The presence of roadside infrastructure units (RSUs) is one of the unique characteristics
of VANETs. Some related works take advantage of this feature to achieve privacy require-
ments. 1) Lu et al. in [16] developed a conditional privacy preservation scheme, called ECPP,
which divides privacy requirements into three levels. The first level is anticipated by TA. TA
is capable to trace the real identity of vehicles from a signed safety message. From the users’
perspective, no privacy is defined in the first level. In the second level, each safety message
is anonymously authenticated, but an adversary can trace a vehicle by collecting messages.
The third level is the strongest privacy level. An individual cannot be traced by collecting
messages of the vehicles. In ECPP, RSUs play an important role to achieve the three pri-
vacy levels. RSUs are responsible to issue a temporary public key certificate, which vehicles
use to sign safety messages. The temporary certificate does not reveal the real identity of a
vehicle. Vehicles determine the lifetime of a certificate. When vehicle requests a certificate
from an RSU, the vehicle indicates the lifetime of the certificate. Then the RSU issues the
requested certificate. Before an issued certificate is expired, a vehicle should request a new
certificate from a nearby RSU. The unfixed lifetime is to prevent an adversary from linking
multiply certificates of an individual vehicle. RSUs sign each temporary certificate using a
group signature scheme, which prevents an adversary from having any knowledge of location
information during the use of a certificate. However, TA has the highest authority, which is
not only able to recover the real identity of a vehicle from its message signature, but is also
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able to reveal the real identity of an issuer (RSU) from a temporary public key certificate.
The abilities of TA is used in case of a dispute. 2) J. Freudiger et al. in [17] introduced a
mix-zone scheme to protect the location privacy for vehicles. An RSU manages a mix-zone,
in which vehicles change their pseudo ID and corresponding public key. An adversary cannot
link two pseudo IDs from the same vehicle when the vehicle passes through a mix-zone. In
the mix-zone scheme, RSUs are located at intersections. Vehicles that go through an intersec-
tion process mutual authentication with the RSU, and then obtain a secret key from the RSU.
All legitimate vehicles share the same secret key. When vehicles within an intersection send
safety messages, vehicles first sign them with their temporary public key and then encrypt
the whole message with the secret key. An adversary without the secret key cannot see the
content of the message including the used public certificates, and thus the adversary cannot
link two pseudo IDs used before and after a vehicle going through a mix-zone. However, the
secret key cannot stop a legitimate vehicle from link such two IDs because any legitimate
vehicle has the same secret key. Therefore, the mix-zone scheme cannot thwart an internal
attack.
Aiming at minimizing the communication overhead and initiate a tradeoff between the
security and efficiency, Raya et al. in [18] proposed a secure traffic aggregation scheme.
Under their design, firstly, cells are defined and predetermined according to the physical road
constructions. When vehicles are located in a cell, the vehicle that is physically closest to
the center of the cell is automatically taken as the group leader of the vehicles in the cell,
which is delegated to aggregate messages for the whole group when the message is going to
be relayed to the leader of the neighboring groups. The aggregation of messages can achieve
a significant reduction in the overhead for vehicle to vehicle communications. However, the
vehicle closest to the center of a cell could change frequently, leading to a frequent update of
the group leader of a cell (e.g., once in a few seconds), which indicates that the approach can
be further improved in terms of its efficiency and practical applicability.
To evict misbehaving and faulty nodes, Raya et al. in [19] introduced a revocation
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scheme. The scheme consists of three parties: revocation of trust components, misbehavior
detection system, and local eviction protocol. (1) The revocation of trust component scheme
is based on using a tamper-proof device, which is embedded in each vehicle and works as an
absolutely trust component. Once a Certificate Authority (CA) intends to revoke a vehicle,
CA will initiate a protocol with the trust component of a vehicle through roadside infrastruc-
ture units in range. The trust component faithfully remove the cryptographic materials (e.g.,
keys) from the vehicle. Without cryptographic materials, the revoked vehicle cannot gener-
ate message signatures any more; (2) The Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) is similar
to a traditional Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which can detect anomalies by monitoring
network traffic patterns. MDS uses entropy, as a measure of information, to represent the
normal and anomalous behaviors of vehicles and then compare them. With MDS, a vehicle
can classify messages from its neighbors as faulty or correct. The vehicle sending faulty
message is therefore identified as a misbehaving vehicle. Nevertheless, MDS can only work
based on locations and time stamps. Under applications without location information, MDS
is difficult to detect misbehavior; (3) The local eviction protocol works as a backup of the
revocation of trust components because CA may not revoke a vehicle in time or because the
communication between CA and a vehicle may be interrupted. To evict misbehaving vehicle
locally, vehicles broadcast a warning message indicating a suspect vehicle’s identity and po-
sition when they believe that there is an attacker in range. The warning message is triggered
by MDSs. When the number of warning message regarding a suspect vehicle reaches a pre-
defined threshold, the suspect vehicle is evicted locally. As such, neighboring vehicles ignore
all messages sent by the suspect vehicle. Clearly, this scheme is based on voting evaluation,
and thus the scheme is not robust enough when the traffic density is low.
Even though the previous works addressed some security and privacy issues for vari-
ous applications, unfortunately few of them put the emphasis on the scalability issue that is
caused by the security mechanism. Further more, none of previous works addressed both the
scalability issue and conditional privacy preservation.
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2.3 VANET Security Threats
In VANETs, there are several possible security threats, which are summarized as follows:
• False information attack: Attackers diffuse false information in VANETs. For exam-
ple, an attacker sends a false message telling its neighbors that there is a road accident
ahead. This false message could lead its neighboring vehicles to choose other ways
and leave the road for the attacker to drive.
• DoS attack: Attackers attempt to disturb the normal service of a VAENT. For exam-
ple, attackers continuously send a huge number of dummy messages to wireless chan-
nels aiming to bring down the channel transmission. For a sophisticated attacker, he
may send a large number of messages with invalid signatures. In this case, legitimate
vehicles will spend a lot time verifying invalid signatures, while delaying verifying
legitimate message.
• Replay attack: Attackers resend the messages received from other legitimate vehicles,
to disturb the traffic. The duplicated messages make a vehicle fail to know its neigh-
bor’s correct driving status, e.g., direction, position, speed, etc.
• Impersonation attack: For malicious purposes, an attacker actively masquerades as
another vehicle by using false identities to attack and fool other vehicles. Furthermore,
an attacker could pretend to be an RSU and send fake advertisements.
• Message modification attack: Attackers may alter their perceived information, e.g.,
direction, position, speed etc, to escape the consequence of a criminal accident event.
• Privacy attack: Attackers may abstract the real identity of a target vehicle from its
traffic related messages, and further knows the vehicle location information.
• Trajectory disclosure attack: Attackers may globally observe trajectories of a targeted
vehicle and use the trajectory information to analyze the identity of the targeted vehicle.
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2.4 VANET Security Requirements
The security requirements are directly linked to the threats that are mentioned above. Gener-
ally speaking, five requirements should be met in VANETs to deal with the above mentioned
threats: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, conditional privacy, and scalability. These
requirements are fundamental so that every VANET application should follow.
2.4.1 Authentication
Authentication is the ability to ascertain that a user or a thing is indeed the one that it claims
to be. Particularly in VANETs, authentication means verifying the identity of a vehicle and
distinguishing legitimate vehicles from unauthorized vehicles. Message authentication is im-
portant in VANETs because it ensures that a received message is really sent from a legitimate
and authorized vehicle in the network. For safety applications in V2V communication, the
authentication requirement can deal with a masquerade attack. For commercial applications
in V2I communication, authentication ensures that each user is authorized and he only has
access to services that he is authorized to use. Thereby, authentication is a fundamental
access control mechanism in VANETs.
2.4.2 Integrity
Due to the nature of wireless communication, the wireless channel is vulnerable to active
attacks, e.g., modifications, additions, and falsification. Integrity is to assure that messages
exchanged between vehicles do not suffer from these attacks, and all messages sent by vehi-
cles are delivered unaltered. Therefore, integrity protection is a highly essential requirement
for vehicular communications.
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2.4.3 Conditional Privacy
Undoubtedly, the driver and the passenger benefited from the traffic related messages au-
tomatically sent by other vehicles. However, these messages include the sender’s private
information such as the vehicle’s identity (plate license number), locations, directions, and
so on. Clearly, people are not willing to expose these private information to third parties.
Hence, a secure mechanism should prevent an unauthorized party from knowing the combi-
nation of the real identity and location information. On the other hand, a trust authority (e.g.,
police officers) has the authority to know the real identity of any individual vehicle in case of
criminal chasing by law. Thereby, conditional privacy preservation is essential in VANETs.
2.4.4 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation is the ability to prevent an authorized vehicle from denying having sent the
message or denying the contents of the message sent by it. Non-repudiation is a critical
requirement for vehicular communication because it can prevent an attacker from denying
the attacks that he/her launched. On the other hand, the property of non-repudiation enables
a trust authority to trace the identity of an internal attacker, thus it is useful to thwart internal
attacks.
2.4.5 Scalability
Scalability is easily ignored when designing a security protocol in a traditional MANET
because the number of users in MANETs is not big and failing to consider scalability could
not lead to vital attacks. However, in VANETs scalability is an extremely important factor.
Vehicles should be able to authenticate incoming messages in a timely manner even in a high
density area. Otherwise, many useful messages will have to be dropped before they could be
verified if the security scheme is not efficient in high density areas. Moreover, a scheme that
is not scalable is vulnerable to DoS attacks.
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2.5 Security Architecture
2.5.1 Public key Infrastructure
VANETs need a hierarchical PKI. In particular, Vehicle and RSUs register themselves in a
province. Each province has a CA, which issues a public/private key pair and the corre-
sponding PKC to each vehicle and RSU. On the top of each province CA is a country CA.
The country CA issues a certified public/private key pair and PKC to each province CA.
Vehicles registered in a country could travel to other countries. Thus, the trust relationship
between different country CAs is not hierarchical but flat. Different country CAs can es-
tablish mutual trust relationship each other. Vehicles are pre-installed several country CAs’
PKC that are treated as trust PKC.
To authenticate messages of a vehicle from a foreign country, vehicles first find out the
foreign country PKC in their pre-installed CAs’ database, use the found CA’s PKC to verify
the province PKC of the foreign vehicle, and then use the province PKC to verify the vehicle’s
PKC. A single failure of verifying any certificate in the above steps leads to the failure of the
message authentication.
2.5.2 Key distribution
In VANETs, secure key materials should be distributed among four entities: key manager,
vehicle, RSU, and TA.
• Key manager: The key manager could be a government office, which is responsible
for generating, distributing, and managing private/public key pairs and certificates to
vehicles and RSUs. The key manager records all key materials and real information of
every vehicle and RSU.
• Vehicle: Vehicles obtain key materials from the key manager. Vehicles store their
private key in a safety place, for example a tamper-proof device, which is a special
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hardware and secure against any compromise attempt in any circumstance [9, 12].
For privacy purpose, vehicles could have several valid private/public key pairs and
anonymous certificates.
• RSU: Similar to vehicles, RSUs acquire key material from the key manager. It is un-
necessary to protect the privacy of RSUs, and thus RSUs do not need to have multiple
private/public key pairs and anonymous certificates.
• TA: TA as a cental authority has the authorization to reveal the real identity of any
vehicle in a network. Therefore, the key manager distributes TA special key materials,
which enables TA to recover a specific vehicle’s identity from its anonymous certifi-
cate.
2.6 Summary
In this section, we have reviewed the related work regarding to the security issues in VANET,
and enumerated several security attacks that could potentially be conducted in VANETs. In
order to design a robust security system, we have presented essential security requirements,
and have clarified the basic security architecture.
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An Efficient RSU-aided Message
Authentication Scheme
3.1 Introduction
Since security and privacy are essentially important in VANETs, recently more and more
research efforts [20–29] have been put on designing security and privacy preservation proto-
cols. All of the existing solutions adopt asymmetric public key based signature schemes, in
which a vehicle signs a message with its private key, and broadcasts the message attaching
a signature. Receivers verify the signature using the sender’s public key. Such an approach
works properly when the traffic density is low. However, unfortunately, in the case of a high
traffic scenario, this approach results in much high computation overhead for the receivers. In
particular, according to DSRC [1], each vehicle should periodically broadcast a traffic related
message. The time interval can varies from 100 to 300 ms. It is common that, at a certain
metropolitan area, there are 50-150 vehicles in a vehicle’s communication range, which vary
from 300 to 1000 m in accordance with DSRC as well. As such, it is required that a vehicle
is capable to verify up to 1500 messages per second. Such a large number messages not only
induces communication overhead in networks, but also leads to high computation overhead
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for receivers. None of traditional PKI signature algorithms can be directly adopted to verify
the large number of signatures in a short period.
To accelerate the verification speed and avoid the computation overhead caused by asym-
metric cryptography, some researches has been conducted to find better solutions. The Timed
Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [30, 31] scheme, as a broadcast au-
thentication protocol, is the most promising one of the existing solutions. TESLA needs only
a few of hash function operations for message verification, and thus can achieve fast message
verification. However, TESLA is not suitable for VANETs. It is not only because the po-
sition chance of vehicles is too dynamic, but also because TESLA is a delay authentication
protocol while messages in VANETs are delay sensitive. The delay caused by TESLA could
be life-endangered in VANETs. In addition, TESLA is also vulnerable to memory exhaus-
tion attacks. These disadvantages imply that TESLA cannot be used in VANETs. However,
TESLA enlightens us that symmetric cryptography can be used to accelerate the verifica-
tion speed. Motivated by this fact, this chapter proposes an efficient RSU-aided message
authentication scheme, named RAISE, for VANETs. RAISE explores an important feature
of VANETs by employing RSUs to assist vehicles in authenticating messages. With RAISE,
vehicles first perform mutual authentication and key agreement with an RSU. Vehicles that
received safety messages do not need to verify the message through a conventional PKI-based
scheme. Instead, each safety message will be attached with a short Message Authentication
Code (MAC) that is generated by a sender under the secret key shared between the sender
and an RSU. The RSU then verify MACs and disseminate the results of the authenticity of
the safety messages to vehicles in its communication range. The verification of the message
can be performed in an extremely fast manner due to the nature of the MAC authentication
which just needs fast hash operations. The major contributions of RAISE are to improve the
authentication efficiency and reduces the communication overhead.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, preliminaries including
the system model, problem statements, and design objectives are briefly introduced. Sec-
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tion 3.3 presents the proposed message authentication scheme in detail and explains how
the proposed scheme can ensure security and privacy without incurring high overhead and
scalability concerns. Section 3.4 analyzes the performance of the proposed schemes through
extensive simulations. Section 3.5 analyzes the security of the proposed schemes. Finally,
we give the summary in Section 3.6.
3.2 Preliminaries
3.2.1 System Model
A vehicular communication network hierarchically consists of two layers. The upper layer
is composed of Application Servers (ASs) and RSUs. The ASs can be connected with RSUs
through secure channels, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol with either wired
or wireless connections. The ASs provide application data for RSUs, and RSUs work as
gateways to deliver data to the lower layer, which is composed of vehicles. All vehicles and
RSUs keep time synchronization. Vehicles can communicate with each other and with RSUs.
In this chapter, we aim at addressing the security issues in the lower layer.
In general, RSUs have higher computation capability than vehicles, and are trusted since
it is not easy for RSUs to be compromised. According to DSRC, the communication range
of an RSU is adjustable, and thus it can be larger than that of the vehicles, such that some
vehicles can hear from the RSU while the RSU may not hear from the vehicles. The locations
where the density of vehicles is high will be allocated with an RSU, such as an intersection
and any possible traffic bottleneck. Notice that only IVC message authentication is con-
sidered when any RSU is available. For those areas with sparse vehicle distribution, the
scalability issue will not be a problem, and a conventional PKI-based authentication scheme
can sufficiently work well.
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3.2.2 Problem Statement
The current IEEE Trial-Use standard [8] for VANET security provides detailed documenta-
tion including the choice of cryptosystems. To authenticate a message’s sender and guarantee
the message’s integrity, OBUs or RSUs should sign messages with their private keys before
the messages are sent. Fig. 3.1 shows the format of a signed message [8], where a 125-
byte certificate and a 56-byte ECDSA signature have to be attached for each 69-byte IVC
message. Clearly, the cryptographic overhead (the certificate and the signature) takes up a












69 Bytes 181 Bytes
Figure 3.1: The format of the signed message
Cryptographic operations also lead to high computation cost for receivers to verify these
messages. According to DSRC [1], a vehicle sends each message within a time interval of
100 ms to 300 ms. Generating a signature every 100 ms is not an issue for current public key
based signature schemes. However, in the case that 50-150 vehicles are within the commu-
nication range, the receiver needs to verify up to 1500 messages per second. The traditional
digital signature algorithm cannot enable a vehicle to verify all of the messages every sec-
ond. We evaluate the verification speed digital signature schemes, i.e., DSA (2048 bits) and
ECDSA (224 bits), on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0GHz desktop with 1GB RAM running Fedora
Core 4 based on cryptographic library MIRACL [32]. The verification speed (verifications
per second) of DSA and ECDSA are respectively 62 and 258 per second. In addition to
message signatures, public key certificates have to be verified as well. Thereby, DSA and
ECDSA cannot achieve the desired verification speed.
Furthermore, in addition to safety related messages, non-safety related messages, such as
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inquiry information, emails, media data, peer-to-peer forwarding data [25], routing informa-
tion [33, 34], traffic management information [35], etc., also take up a significant percentage
in vehicular communications. These messages can significantly increase as the traffic density
increases, and thus the security-related scalability issue for non-safety related messages also
needs to be addressed.
To address such an issue, a desired security scheme should be scalable to data traffic in
VANETs. Therefore, a verification algorithm is required to be very fast such that received
messages by vehicles can be processed timely. Unfortunately, none of traditional digital
signature schemes is directly suitable for this time requirement in VANETs.
Embedding a special hardware and increasing the number of computing processors could
be an obvious solution to address the scalability issue. However, these approaches certainly
increase the cost of a vehicle. In contrast, software solutions are highly desired.
3.2.3 Design Objectives
In this chapter, we aim at achieving the following security objectives:
• Message integrity and source authentication: All accepted messages should be deliv-
ered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be authenticated to guard against
the impersonation attack.
• Low communication overhead and fast verification: The security scheme should be
efficient in terms of small communication overhead and acceptable processing latency.
A large number of message signatures should be verified in a short interval.
• Conditional privacy preservation: The identities of vehicles should be hidden from
a normal message receiver during the authentication process in order to protect the
senders’ private information, such as the driver’s identity and any personal information.
On the other hand, the authorities should be able to trace the sender of a message by
revealing its identity in case of any exceptional case such as liability investigation.
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• Prevention of internal attack: Different from the study in [36], a normal vehicle hold-
ing its own keying material cannot obtain other vehicles’ keying materials. Further-
more, even if a vehicle is compromised, an adversary cannot use the compromised
vehicle to obtain other vehicles’ important information.
3.3 RSU-aided Message Authentication Scheme
3.3.1 Scheme Overview
In this section, we propose an RSU-aided message authentication scheme, named RAISE.
Toward a better understanding of RAISE, we first present an overview of RAISE, which
includes the following four steps, also corresponding to the steps in Fig. 3.2.
• Registration: In the first step, any vehicle equipped with an OBU needs to resister
itself to a key manager, who is responsible for distributing a pair of private/public
(SK/PK) key, and PKC to each vehicle. In addition, the key manager also plays a
role as a security authority, who is capable of tracing their real identities of vehicles
form their certificates. This role is important and necessary specially when criminal
events happen. Thereby, during the registration, vehicles/drivers must provide the key
manager with the real identity information. The registration process needs to be done
before V2V and V2I communications.
• Symmetric Key Establishment: When vehicles enter the communication range of an
RSU, vehicles initiate a mutual authentication process with an RSU. An RSU authen-
ticates vehicles by verifying their signatures. Vehicles compute message signatures
with their private keys, and RSUs verify the signatures and their corresponding public
key certificates. A valid signature means that the signer of the signature is a legitimate
user in VANETs. In a similar way, vehicles can also authenticate an RSU. Meanwhile,
the messages that have been signed by vehicles and RSUs include secret credentials,
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which can be used to compute a shared key. Here, Diffie-Hellman key agreement [37]
could be adopted to establish the shared symmetric key. It is worth noticing that dif-
ferent vehicles share different keys with an RSU. Vehicles do not know the key shared














Distribute public/private keys, public key certificate
Process mutual authentication and symmetric key establishment
RSUs receive messages from vehicles, and RSUs compute HAggt
RSUs send HAggt to vehicles, and vehicles verify HAggt
Figure 3.2: The illustration of the message authentication using RAISE
• Hash Aggregation: Having the shared key, each vehicle can use it to compute a MAC of
a message. Then, each vehicle one-hop broadcast a tuple (pseudo ID, message, MAC)
every 300 ms. Neighboring vehicles within the coverage of a vehicle can receive such a
message, but they cannot verify the MAC. It is because they do not have the shared key.
In this case, the neighbors just first buffer the received (ID, message)s for a while. On
the other hand, an RSU also receives the message. Since the RSU has the shared key,
it can verify the MAC. Thereby, in our scheme, RSUs are responsible for verifying
MACs. After an RSU verifies all received MACs, it computes hash(ID, message)
corresponding to each MAC. Then, it concatenates all computed hashes, which we
call HAggt. At last, the RSU sends HAggt back to vehicles. In addition, the signature
on hash(HAggt) also needs to be sent with HAggt. The period of sending a HAggt is
28
Chapter 3. An Efficient RSU-aided Message Authentication Scheme
shorter than 300 ms, e.g., 30 ms. This period is adjustable, and it determines message
authentication delay.
• Verification: Receiving HAggt and its signature, vehicles first use an RSU’s public key
to verify the signature. Then, they hash each (ID, message) which they received within
previous 300 ms, and check whether hash(ID, message)s within HAggt. If a hash(ID,
message) is in HAggt, the buffered (ID, message) is verified as a valid message.
Since the first registration step is simple and straightforward, the more explanation of the
registration step is skipped. The left three steps, which are symmetric key establishment,
hash aggregation, and verification, will be presented in more detail in the following sections.
3.3.2 Symmetric Key Establishment
When a vehicle Vi detects the existence of an RSU R (e.g., through a Hello message from
the R), the Vi initiates anonymous mutual authentication and establishes a shared secret key
with the R. This can be achieved by adopting the Diffie-Hellman key establishment proto-
col secured with signature scheme [38]. The mutual authentication and key establishment
processes are shown as follows:
Vi −→ R : {aP | CertVi}PKR .
R −→ Vi : IDi | bP | {IDi | aP | bP}SKR .
Vi −→ R : {IDR | bP | aP}SKVi .
where aP and bP (a, b ∈ Z∗q , P is a generator of an addition group G) are random elements
of the Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol, and the shared session key between the
R and Vi is Ki ← abP . When receiving the first message from the Vi, the R decrypts
{aP | CertVi}PKR (| as a concatenation operation) with its private key SKR, and then verifies
the Vi’s public key PKVi in the anonymous certificate CertVi . Then, the R sends IDi |
bP | {IDi | aP | bP}SKR to the Vi. The Vi verifies the signature {IDi | aP | bP}SKR
on IDi | aP | bP . At last, the Vi sends back the signature {IDR | bP | aP}SKVi , where
29
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications
IDR is the identity of the R, and the R verifies the signature. If the above three steps are
completed correctly, the mutual authentication succeeds. Note that the mutual authentication
in the protocol is provably secure (refer to [38] for more details). The pseudo identity IDi
that the R sends to the vehicle Vi in the second flow is uniquely linked with Ki1. With IDi,
R can know which vehicle sends the message, and can further verify the authenticity of the
message with their shared symmetric key. Therefore, R maintains an ID-Key table in its
local database, as shown in Fig. 3.4(a). Vehicles update their anonymous certificates once
they get out of the radio range of an RSU. For instance, vehicles choose a new public/private
key pair [12] to sign messages. In Fig. 3.4(a), Ti denotes the time when R receives the latest
message from Vi. Ti is used to determine the freshness of a record. If the interval between
the current time of R and Ti exceeds a pre-defined threshold, the record corresponding to Ti
will be removed from the ID-Key table and stored into the trace evidence table as shown in
Fig. 3.4(b), which will be used for the purpose of traceability. The LTi in Fig. 3.4(b) is used
to control how long trace evidence is kept. In reality, it is decided by the authority, and is
much larger than the Ti in Fig. 3.4(a). The details of the trace process will be discussed in
the following section.
3.3.3 Hash Aggregation
Once the vehicle Vi establishes the symmetric key Ki with an RSU R, Vi can use Ki to
compute the message authentication code MACKi(IDi | Mi | TSi) on IDi | Mi | TSi, where
IDi is Vi’s pseudo identity assigned by R, Mi is the message to be sent, and TSi is a timestamp
that records the current time when sending the message Mi. TSi is used to thwart the replay
attack. Then, Vi one-hop broadcasts ⟨IDi | Mi | TSi | MACKi(IDi | Mi | TSi)⟩. Because Ki
is only known by R in addition to Vi itself, only R can verify Mi. Thus, to make other vehicles
1In order to protect the privacy, it is necessary that vehicles do not have unique pseudo IDs. This case will be
discussed in Chapter 3.3.5. For ease of representation, we explain the scheme with the assumption that vehicles
are allocated with unique pseudo ID in this subsection
30
Chapter 3. An Efficient RSU-aided Message Authentication Scheme
Verify MACK1, MACK2, MACKn
ID1, message1, MACK1
hashK1(ID1 | message1 | TS1)
ID2, message2, MACK2
hashK2(ID2 | message2 | TS2)
IDn, messagen, MACKn
hashKn(IDn | messagen | TSn)
HAggt=hash(ID1|message1|TS1) | 
hash(ID2|message2|TS2) | hash(IDn|messagen|TSn)




Figure 3.3: The illustration of the message authentication process at an RSU
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Figure 3.4: (a) The ID-Key table; (b) The trace evidence table
be able to verify the authenticity of Mi, and at the same time to reduce communication
overhead, the RSU R is responsible to aggregate multiple authenticated messages in a single
packet and send it out. Fig. 3.3 abstractly illustrates the message authentication process at an
RSU. The detailed process is given as follows:
1. R checks if the time interval between the current time and the time when R sent the
last message authenticity notification packet is less than a predefined threshold ∆t. If
so, go to Step 2. Otherwise, go to Step 4.
2. When R receives a message, ⟨IDi | Mi | TSi | MACKi(IDi | Mi | TSi)⟩ sent by the
vehicle Vi, R first checks whether IDi is in R’s ID-Key table. If yes, go to Step 3.
Otherwise, go to Step 4.
3. R uses IDi’s Ki to verify MACKi(IDi | Mi | TSi). If it is valid, R computes H(IDi |
Mi | TSi). Otherwise, drop the packet. Go to Step 1.
4. R aggregates all hashes generated at Step 3, i.e., HAggt = H(ID1 | M1 | TS1) |
H(ID2 | M2 | TS2) | ... | H(IDn | Mn | TSn), and signs it with its private key SKR.
Then, R one-hop broadcasts ⟨HAggt | {HAggt}SKR⟩ to vehicles within its communica-
tion range.
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The predefined threshold ∆t in the above algorithm can affect message authentication
delay, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3.4.2. In addition, the above algorithm
supports the identity traceability property. Since there is a one-to-one mapping between the
key Ki and the certificate CertVi in the trace evidence table, the RSU can distinguish the
unique sender of a message. Thus, in case that a malicious vehicle sends a bogus message
(e.g., the context of the message is found to be fake after a while), the RSU can trace back to
the message sender by finding out its certificate. The RSU could also report the certificate to
a trusted authority for further investigation.
3.3.4 Verification
When a vehicle receives messages sent by other vehicles, it only buffers the received mes-
sages in its local database without verifying them immediately. The buffered record has the
following format: Mi, IDi, TSi, H(IDi |Mi | TSi) (notice that H(IDi |Mi | TSi) is computed
by the receiver). Once vehicles obtain the signed packet ⟨HAggt | {HAggt}SKR⟩ from the
RSU, they are able to verify the buffered messages one by one. First of all, vehicles use the
RSU’s public key PKR to verify the signature {HAggt}SKR . If it is valid, vehicles will check
the validity of the previously received messages buffered in the record in the local database.
This is done by comparing whether there is a match between the buffered record with the de-
aggregated message. For example, Vi checks if H(IDi |Mi | TSi) coming in HAggt has been
buffered in any record before. If so, Mi is consumed. Otherwise, Vi waits to see if Mi will
be in the next HAggt packet. If H(IDi | Mi | TSi) does not appear in two2 successive aggre-
gated HAggt packets, Mi is regarded as invalid. The reason that H(IDi | Mi | TSi) is double
checked is because the RSU may have not aggregated the message Mi yet when Vi receives
the first HAggt packet from the RSU. In addition, a vehicle has to be capable of verifying all
2Suppose a vehicle Vi receives a message Mj sent by Vj , and then immediately receives an aggregate HAggt
sent by an RSU R. Since the R could not receive Mj at all before the R sends the HAggt, H(Mj) will appear
at the following HAggt.
33
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications
incoming messages sent by neighboring vehicles, which means all messages received by the
vehicle can be received by its corresponding RSU as well. However, if the communications
between the RSU and a vehicle (or RSU-to-vehicle Communications (RVC)) has the same
distance limit as that of IVC, a vehicle will lose the messages sent by the vehicles that have
not been in the eligible distance with the RSU. Fig. 3.5 shows the illustration. Let the dis-
tance limit of RVC be r. The RSU can communicate with vehicles V1 and V2. Since V3 has
not associated with the RSU, V2 cannot verify messages from V3 although the two vehicles
are supposed to be communicable. To overcome this problem, we require the distance limit
for RVC to be two times longer than that for IVC. The distance between vehicles and vehi-
cles and between vehicles and RSUs can be derived from GPS coordinates, because the GPS










Figure 3.5: The radio range of an RSU
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3.3.5 Enhancement of User Privacy
With RAISE, if a vehicle does not change its pseudo ID all the time during the association
period, an adversary can trace the vehicle movement trajectory according to the vehicle’s un-
changed ID. Therefore, the vehicle’s trace privacy is violated during the small time duration.
To preserve the trace privacy, we employ the concept of k-anonymity (k entities are not
distinguishable) [39] in the proposed RAISE scheme to mix k vehicles. With RAISE, RSUs
assign a common pseudo ID to k vehicles, where the k vehicles (as a group) will take the
same pseudo ID when communicating with the RSU. When an adversary intends to trace a
specific vehicle through the pseudo ID, he/she will easily get lost after the group of vehicles
passes through an intersection (where an RSU is allocated). In other words, the route of a
specific vehicle cannot be identified. The biggest value of k would be the total number of
vehicles within the coverage range of an RSU, in which all vehicles’ messages are mixed and
cannot be distinguished. Notice that such a scenario is equivalent to the case that vehicles
have no identity at all.
In the k-anonymity RAISE, RSUs can still identify a vehicle by finding the symmetric
key shared with the vehicle, and each pseudo ID corresponds to k unique symmetric keys.
Suppose a vehicle Vi sends ⟨ID | Mi | TSi | MACKi(ID | Mi | TSi)⟩ to RSU R. R first
finds out k possible keys corresponding to the pseudo identity ID. Then, R sequently checks
whether MACKi(ID | Mi | TSi) is equal to MACK(ID | Mi | TSi)′ that is generated by one
of the k symmetric keys. If there is a match, the message is considered valid. Since a vehicle
holds a distinct key shared with the RSU, the key that makes the above comparison can be
used to find the message sender’s anonymous certificate that was used during the first mutual
authentication process. This can be done by looking up the RSU’s local ID-Key table. Being
able to find out the anonymous certificate used during the mutual authentication process is to
support the future ID traceability property.
However, if there is still no match with the two MAC values after R has tried all possible
k keys, the message is considered as invalid and will be dropped. After this process, R can
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continue the message aggregation process as presented in Chapter 3.3.3.
With the adoption of k-anonymity, the verification process remains the same as before.
Vehicles compare whether there is a match between the de-aggregated H(IDi | Mi | TSi)
from HAggt and the buffered H(IDi | Mi | TSi) value in any record. Here, the cost of
comparison computation can be neglected compared with message verification of the PKI-
based scheme in [12].
3.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use the ns-2 simulator [40] to evaluate the performance of RAISE in terms
of the message loss radio, the message end-to-end delay, and the communication overhead,
respectively, compared with the group signature based scheme in [14] and the standard PKI-
based ECDSA signature scheme in [8]. We simulate a traffic scenario with high vehicle
density. An RSU is located at an intersection, and 30-200 vehicles can associate with the
RSU. Notice that an RSU is used only in RAISE, and other schemes do not need an RSU’s
help. The inter-vehicular distance varies from 7.5 m to 15 m to simulate the scenarios with
different traffic densities. The distance limits for IVC and RVC are 300 m and 600 m, re-
spectively. Inter-vehicle messages are sent every 300 ms at each vehicle. IEEE 802.11a is
used to simulate the transmission protocol in medium access control layer. The bandwidth
of the channel is 6 Mb/s. The group signature verification delay is 11 ms [42]. The ECDSA
signature verification delay is 3.87 ms [42] 3. All possible cryptographic operations in the
simulation are considered to have same simulation delay.
3In [42], the 224 bits ECDSA cryptographic delays are quoted from MIRACL cryptographic lib [32] with
the 3GHz Pentium IV system.
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3.4.1 Message Loss Ratio
Average message Loss Ratio (LR) is defined in Eq. 3.1, where N represents the total num-
ber of vehicles in the simulation. For the group signature based and PKI-based signature
schemes, M imac represents the total number of messages received by the i-th vehicle in the
medium access control layer, and M iapp represents the total number of messages consumed
by the i-th vehicle in the application layer. For RAISE, M imac represents the total number of
messages received directly from other vehicles in the medium access control layer; M iapp rep-
resents the total number of H(IDi | Mi | TSi)s that are sent by the RSU, and are consumed
by the application layer. Since RAISE needs two hops communication, we consider the loss
































RAISE with ∆t = 10 ms
Figure 3.6: Average loss ratio vs. traffic load
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Fig. 3.6 shows the relationship between the message loss ratio and the traffic load.
The traffic load is represented by the number of vehicles. For RAISE, the RSU periodically
broadcasts an aggregation of H(IDi | Mi | TSi)s every 10 ms. From Fig. 3.6, we can
see that the message loss ratio of RAISE, the group signature, and the PKI-based ECDSA
signature schemes increases as the traffic load increases. The group signature based scheme
has the highest loss ratio, because a group signature needs the longest time to be verified. If
the number of received group signatures is beyond the number that a vehicle has the capacity
to verify every 300 ms, the exceeded signatures are dropped. Since verifying a PKI-based
(ECDSA) signature is shorter than a group signature, the PKI-based scheme in Fig. 3.6 ranks
in the second. RAISE, on the other hand, has the lowest loss ratio. The reason is because
RAISE does not require the time-consuming PKI-based signature verification, and instead
RAISE only needs fast hash function operations. However, compared with the PKI-based
schemes, RAISE needs more communications. From the simulation, most of the message
losses of RAISE come from the two-hop wireless transmission.
3.4.2 Message Authentication Delay
Average Message Authentication Delay (MAD) is defined in Eq. 3.2, where N represents
the total number of vehicles in the simulation, M is the number of messages sent by the i-th
vehicle, and K is the number of adjacent vehicles within the i-th vehicle’s communication
range. T i,k,mrecv represents the moment that the k-th vehicle in the application layer receives the
m-th message from the i-th vehicle. T i,k,msend represents the moment that the i-th vehicle in the












(T i,k,mrecv − T
i,k,m
send ) (3.2)
Fig. 3.7 shows the relationship between the message authentication delay and the traffic
load. Again, the group signature scheme has the highest message authentication delay. This
is due to the high delay verifying a message signature. The PKI-based ECDSA scheme and
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RAISE with ∆t = 10 ms
RAISE with ∆t = 5 ms
Figure 3.7: Average message authentication delay vs. traffic load
RAISE yield nearly the same message authentication delay. Since the comparison computa-
tion is very fast, the delay of RAISE is primarily determined by the packet release interval
at the RSU. For example, the packet release interval ∆t is 10 ms in our simulation, which
serves as the main contribution of the message authentication delay. To reduce the message
authentication delay, we may reduce ∆t, e.g., ∆t = 5 ms. However, a too small ∆t brings
two disadvantages in RAISE. First, a smaller ∆t produces more communications, which can
result in higher message loss ratio. Second, a smaller ∆t increases more communication
overhead, which will be further discussed in the next subsection.
3.4.3 Communication Overhead
The communication overhead of ECDSA [41], the group signature based scheme [14], and
RAISE is respectively listed below. With ECDSA, each message yields 181 bytes as the addi-
tional overhead due to cryptographic operations, which includes a certificate and an ECDSA
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RAISE with ∆t = 10 ms
Figure 3.8: Communication overhead vs. traffic load
signature, as shown in Fig. 3.1. With the group signature based scheme, the additional com-
munication overhead is 184 bytes [42]. With RAISE, the additional communication overhead
is 128 bits + 128 bits + (56+2)/n bytes, where the first 128 represents the length of a MAC
sent by a vehicle, the second 128 bits represent the length of a H(IDi |Mi | TSi) packet that
is sent by an RSU, 56 bytes are the length of an ECDSA signature [8] signed by the RSU,
and 2 bytes are the length of a message header as shown in Fig. 3.1. Here, 56+2 bytes are
shared by n messages, because in RAISE n messages are batched and signed once. Note
that n is determined by the density of vehicles and the packet release interval for the RSU to
broadcast a batched packet.
Fig. 3.8 shows the relationship between the overall communication overhead in 1 minute
and the traffic load within an RSU. We can see that RAISE with the time interval of 10 ms has
much lower communication overhead than that of the PKI-based ECDSA signature scheme
and the group signature based scheme. Furthermore, the communication overhead of RAISE
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Figure 3.9: Communication overhead vs. time interval
is 24.94% of the PKI-based ECDSA signature scheme and 23.64% of the group signature
based scheme.
To further illustrate the effect of the time interval on RAISE, Fig. 3.9 shows the rela-
tionship between the time interval and the overall communication overhead, caused by 100,
150, 200, and 250 vehicles, respectively, in 1 minute. Clearly, as the time interval increases,
particularly from 2 ms to 10 ms, the communication overhead decreases sharply. However,
when the time interval is up to 10 ms or larger, it has very little effect on the communica-
tion overhead. This is because the frequency of sending 56+2 bytes decreases as the time
interval increases. From Fig. 11, we can also see that the communication overhead increases
approximately 0.3 megabytes every time the number of vehicles increases by 50.
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3.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed schemes in terms of message in-
tegrity and source authentication, prevention of internal attack, replay attack resistance, and
conditional privacy preservation.
Message integrity and source authentication: With RAISE, a vehicle generates a MAC
for each launched message. The MAC can only be generated by the vehicle that has the
key assigned by the RSU. If an adversary tampers with a message, the RSU cannot find a
responding validation key that can compute a matching MAC for the message, and therefore
the intercepted message will be ignored. In addition, for each vehicle, there is a unique key
stored in the ID-Key table at the RSU side. If an RSU can find out a key to verify a MAC, the
RSU can know the identity of the message sender, and therefore the source is authenticated.
Due to the nature of message integrity and source authentication, typical attacks such as
bogus attack and impersonation attack [12] can be prevented.
Prevention of internal attack: RAISE is robust against not only the external attacks but
also the internal attacks. Even if a vehicle is compromised and its symmetric secret session
key shared with an RSU is exposed to an adversary, the adversary cannot trace other vehicle’s
movement because it cannot distinguish the vehicles that use the same pseudo ID with the
compromised vehicle. Therefore, RAISE can resist key-compromise impersonation attack.
Replay attack resistance: With a replay attack, an adversary replays intercepted messages
in order to impersonate a legitimate vehicle. Clearly, this impersonation cannot work with
RAISE because a time stamp TSi is attached with the corresponding Mi and all vehicles
keep time synchronization. Suppose an adversary intercepts a message ⟨IDi | Mi | TSi |
MACKi(IDi | Mi | TSi)⟩, and launches a replay attack at the time TSj . Because the time
period |TSj − TSi| > ∆T where ∆T is a mutually agreed transmission delay, the receiver
will reject the message. Therefore, RAISE is robust to resist the replay attack.
Conditional privacy preservation: RAISE makes vehicles use pseudo identities to protect
their real identities. Nevertheless, RSUs are able to know the anonymous certificate corre-
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sponding to a pseudo identity, and a trust authority is capable of tracing the real identity of
a vehicle from its anonymous certificate. For example, a vehicle Vi sends a bogus message,
which contains the pseudo identity IDi that an RSU allocates. Once the RSU finds out that the
content of the message is bogus, the RSU can know the anonymous certificate of the Vi from
the trace evidence table in which the IDi uniquely maps the anonymous certificate CertVi as
shown in Fig. 3(b). Further, the RSU gives the certificate CertVi to a trust authority, which
has the ability to trace the real identity of the Vi from CertVi . Therefore, in RAISE, vehicles
cannot tell their real identities each other, while RSUs can distinguish whether two messages
are sent by the same vehicle. The trust authority and RSUs cooperate, which can trace the
real identity of a message sender.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, a novel RSU-aided message authentication scheme, named RAISE, has been
proposed. With RAISE, RSUs are responsible for verifying the authenticity of messages sent
by vehicles and notifying the authentication results back to all the associated vehicles. The
RAISE scheme has many advantages because of its lower computation and communication
overhead, which have been justified through extensive simulations. We have presented the
security analysis to analyze that RAISE is able to achieve message integrity, source authen-
tication, and prevention of internal attacks. In addition, RAISE also achieves the conditional
privacy preservation: the privacy among vehicles is protected by adopting the k-anonymity




An Efficient Identity-based Batch
Verification Scheme
4.1 Introduction
In the last chapter, we have introduced RAISE, an RSU-aided message authentication scheme.
With the assistance of RSUs, RAISE is able to improve authentication efficiency and reduce
communication overhead. However, in general, RSUs may not cover all the busy streets of a
city or a highway in some situations, for example, at the beginning of a VANETs’ deployment
period, or due to the physical damage of some RSUs, or simply for economic considerations.
Under these circumstances, unfortunately RAISE cannot be used. Thereby, without the pres-
ence of RSUs, how to improve authentication efficiency and address scalability issues, and
how to acheive conditional privacy preservation in VANETs still motivate us to explore the
corresponding solutions.
In this chapter, we address the above issues with a novel approach. We propose an
identity-based batch verification (IBV) scheme for message authentication in VANETs. The
IBV scheme does not need the assistance of RSUs, and works as a supplementary approach
of RAISE. IBV uses identity-based cryptography and batch verification techniques. It has
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the following unparalleled features: 1) Multiple signatures can be verified at the same time
instead of one after the other as that in the previously traditional PKI signature schemes.
Therefore, the signature verification speed can be significantly improved such that the com-
putational workload of each vehicle can be alleviated; 2) By generating distinct pseudo iden-
tities and the corresponding private keys for signing each message with a tamper-proof de-
vice, privacy regarding user identity and location of the vehicles can be protected; 3) The
identities of the vehicles can be uniquely revealed by TA under exceptional cases; and 4)
Since identity-based cryptography is employed, efforts on certificate management and the
transmission overhead can be significantly reduced. In addition, to find invalid signatures in
a batch of signatures, we investigate and adopt some group testing approaches which can find
invalid signatures efficiently.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, background and pre-
liminary knowledge related to the proposed research is given, including the system model,
security requirements, identity-based cryptography, bilinear pairing technique, batch verifi-
cation, and group testing technique. In Section 4.3, the proposed batch verification scheme
is described in details. In Section 4.4, the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed. In
Section 4.5, group testing approaches are introduced to detect invalid signatures. In Section
4.6, the performance evaluation is presented. Finally, we give the summary in Section 4.7.
4.2 Background and Preliminaries
4.2.1 System Model
In VANETs, there are four entities: TA, key manager, vehicle, and RSU. In this chapter,
we investigate the V2V communication where there is no RSU presence and assistance. We
only consider V2V communication and omit V2I communication. Each vehicle periodically
broadcast a traffic related message. The time period is 100-300 ms. PKI is adopted in our
system. Each vehicle has a signing private key and a corresponding public key. Before
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sending the messages, vehicles sign messages with their private keys. Vehicles accept the
messages only if their signatures are valid. In our system, each vehicle is equipped with a
tamper-proof device, which is secure against any compromise attempt in any circumstance.
With the tamper-proof device on vehicles, an adversary cannot extract any data stored in the
device including key material, data, and code [9, 12].
4.2.2 Security Requirements
The V2V communication scenario is subject to the following three security requirements:
fast message authentication, identity privacy preserving, and traceability, which are further
discussed as below.
• Fast message authentication: Messages from vehicles have to be authenticated to con-
firm that they are indeed sent unaltered by legitimate ones. Further more, when the
traffic density becomes high, the number of messages that a vehicle receives increases.
To avoid any possible performance bottleneck, we require a novel signature verification
scheme, in which a vehicle can verify as many signatures as possible. The verification
scheme should not depend on the assistance of RSUs.
• Identity privacy preservation: In vehicular communication, due to its broadcasting
nature, overhearing an identity-specific information could happen frequently. If the
employed signature scheme is an ordinary digital signature, the signature would easily
leak one’s identity information [43]. Even though a pseudo identity is employed as
a mask, an outside observer can also link multiple signatures to one vehicle through
traffic analysis. This issue is called linkability, which may incur a location privacy
violation problem [7]. Therefore, identity privacy preserving is required.
• Traceability: The TA should have the ability to retrieve a vehicle’s real identity from
its pseudo identity when the signature is in dispute or when the content of a message is
46
Chapter 4. An Efficient Identity-based Batch Verification Scheme
bogus. Both identity privacy preservation and traceability requirements constitute the
conditional privacy preservation requirement which is presented in the last chapter.
In this chapter, we aim to address all the aforementioned security requirements without
the assistance of RSUs.
4.2.3 Identity-based Cryptography
Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) is a type of public-key cryptography, in which the public
key of a user is unique information identifying the user. The unique information could be
a user’s name, email address, and IP address. In an Identity Based System (IBS), any party
can generate a public key from a well-known identity value, and a Trust Third Party (TTP)
generates the corresponding private key, which is also referred to as a master key. TTP
publishes a master public key and keeps the corresponding master key. Using the master
public key and a known ID, any party can compute the public key corresponding to the ID.
The corresponding private key of ID can be obtained from TTP, which uses its’s master key
to generate the private key for the identity ID.
Compared with the public key cryptosystem with certificates, IBS has some advantages.
First, IBS simplifies the certificate management because an identity (a public key) of a user
is well-known for the public and it is unnecessary for the public key certificate distribution.
Second, since there is no certificate needed in IBS, the communication overhead caused by
certificates can also been reduced.
4.2.4 Bilinear Pairing
Since bilinear pairing work as the basis of our proposed identity-based scheme in this chapter,
we briefly introduce the bilinear pairing as follows.
Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group.
G and GT have the same prime order q, i.e., |G| = |GT | = q. Let ê : G × G → GT be an
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bilinear map, which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: For all P, Q, R ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z∗q , ê(Q,P + R) = ê(P + R,Q) =
ê(P,Q) · ê(R,Q). In particular, ê(aP, bP ) = ê(P, bP )a = ê(aP, P )b = ê(P, P )ab.
• Non-degenerate: There exist P, Q ∈ G such that ê(P,Q) ̸= 1GT , where 1GT is the
identity element of GT
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê(P,Q) for any P, Q ∈ G.
Such an bilinear map ê is called an admissible pairing, and can be constructed by the modified
Weil [44] or Tate pairings [45] on elliptic curves. The group that possesses such a map ê is
called a bilinear group, on which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy [46]
to solve while the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is believed hard [47]. For
example, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G and any a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , there exists an efficient algorithm
to determine whether ab = c mod q by checking ê(aP, bP ) ?= ê(P, cP ), while there exists
no algorithm that can compute abP ∈ G with non-negligible probability within polynomial
time.
4.2.5 Batch Verification
With the pervasiveness of telecommunication applications, the demand and requirement on
authentication for communication security become more stringent. The delay caused by
verification of a bulk of signatures may dramatically impede transmission throughput and
impair the system applicability. In order to speed up the process of verification, a batch
verification scheme should be a good alternative solution since it can verify all the signatures
received in a time window with rather short time compared to verify each signature one after
the other. The general definition of batch verification is defined below.
Let Gen, Sign, Verify respectively represent the key generation, signature signing and
verification algorithms of a signature scheme. Gen outputs a signing and verification key
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pair (sk, pk). Sign(sk,m) uses the signing key sk to compute a signature σ on the input
message m. Verify(pk,m, σ) outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on m that is signed using sk
corresponding to the public key pk, and 0 otherwise. Let P1, P2, . . . , Pn be n signers, whose
corresponding key pairs are (sk1, pk1), (sk2, pk2), . . ., (skn, pkn), respectively. Let Θ be a
collection of n tuples of (Pi,mi, σi). Batch(Θ) is called a batch verification algorithm pro-
vided Batch(Θ) =1 if and only if Verify(pki,mi, σi) outputs 1 for all i. The time consuming
on Batch(Θ) is much less than the sum of the time consuming on Verify(pki,mi, σi) n times.
The batch cryptography based on RSA was introduced by Fiat [48] in 1989. Some other
batch signature schemes were proposed later [49–53]. The latest batch verification scheme
proposed in [54] is based on the CL signature scheme [55], and is the first solution on batch
verification without using random oracles, in which the computation efficiency can be sig-
nificantly improved. With the batch verification scheme of [54], verifying a single signature
requires 3 pairing operations, while verifying n signatures also takes 3 pairing operations
instead of 3n pairing operations. In other words, the verification time of the dominant op-
eration (i.e., paring) is independent of the number of signatures to verify. Therefore, the
batch verification can dramatically decrease the time spent on verifying a large number of
signatures, which can achieve much better scalability. In this chapter, we propose an efficient
identity-based batch verification scheme based on the improved CL signature scheme in [54],
and the proposed scheme is perfectly suitable for VANET communications.
4.2.6 Group Testing Technique
Group testing technique was first presented in World War II, and was motivated by the task
to testing blood samplers of draftees to detect syphilis. In this application, each draftee
was taken a blood sample. There were millions of draftees, and only a few thousand of
draftees had the syphilis disease. A single test on the combination of multiple blood samples
returned positive if at lease one sample was positive. A positive combination was divided
and then further tested with other positive samples. On the other hand, a single test on the
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combination of multiple samples returned negative if any of the samples was negative. A
negative combination can save many individual tests. The group testing technique was to
find an efficient strategy to combine blood samples aiming to find the positive blood samples
with as the few number of tests as possible. In our application, the objective of group testing
is to find invalid signatures with the minimal number of batch verification.
4.3 Batch Verification for Traffic Information Messages
In this section, we propose a novel Identity-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme for traffic
related message transmission. The proposed scheme includes the following four phases: the
key generation and pre-distribution phase, the pseudo identity and private key generation
phase, the message signing phase, and the batch verification phase.
4.3.1 Key Generation and Pre-distribution
In our scheme, TA is in charge of checking the vehicle’s identity, and generating and pre-
distributing the private master keys of the vehicles. Prior to the network deployment, the
TA sets up the system parameters for each vehicle. It is worth noticing that the processes of
key generation and pre-distribution in our scheme are only processed once and they do not
participate in every message authentication and verification. The detail of key generation and
pre-distribution are presented as follows.
• Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by P , GT be a cyclic multiplicative group,
and G and GT have the same order q. Let ê : G×G→ GT be a bilinear map.
• The TA first randomly chooses s1, s2 ∈ Z∗q as its two master keys, and computes
Ppub1 = s1P, Ppub2 = s2P as its public keys. These two master keys of the TA are then
loaded in the vehicles’ tamper-proof device.
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• Each vehicle are preloaded with the public parameters {G, GT , q, P, Ppub1, Ppub2}. In
addition, the tamper-proof device of each vehicle is preloaded with the parameters
{s1, s2}.
• To activate the tamper-proof device, each vehicle is assigned with a real identity, de-
noted as RID ∈ G, and a password, denoted as PWD, where the RID uniquely identifies
the vehicle, while the PWD is required in the authentication process by the tamper-
proof device. Therefore, an adversary cannot take advantages of the tamper-proof
device even if the vehicle is stolen.
4.3.2 Pseudo Identity Generation
To achieve privacy preservation, we exploit to use a tamper-proof device [9, 12, 56, 57],
which is responsible for generating random pseudo identities and corresponding private keys
based on identity-based cryptography [44]. The tamper-proof device is composed of three
secure modules: an authentication module, a pseudo identity generation module, and a pri-
vate key generation module as shown in Fig. 4.1, which are further described in details as
follows.
Tamper-proof Device
Verify RID and PWD
Authentication
Module
Pseudo ID Generation 
Module


















Figure 4.1: The tamper-proof device
Authentication module: The authentication module works as an access control mecha-
51
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications
nism. A vehicle inputs its unique real identity RID and the password PWD to initiate the
device, where the PWD can be the signature of the RID signed by the TA. If the RID and
PWD successfully pass the verification of the authentication module, the RID is delivered to
the next module, the pseudo identity generation module. Otherwise, the device denies pro-
viding services for the vehicle. Clearly, the authentication module enhances the security of
the tamper-proof device since a malicious adversary cannot take advantages of it even though
the tamper-proof device is physically held by the adversary.
Pseudo identity generation module: This module is responsible for generating a list of
random pseudo identities from the authenticated RID. Each pseudo identity IDi of vehicle Vi
is composed of IDi1 and ID
i
2. In this module, the ElGamal encryption algorithm [59] over
the ECC [60] is employed to encrypt the RID as shown in Fig. 4.1. The two items of the
cipher texts are taken as IDi1 and ID
i
2, respectively. In other words, we have ID
i
1 = rP , and
IDi2 = RID⊕H(rPpub1), where r is a random nonce. r is changed each time and guarantees
the distinction of IDi1 and ID
i
2 for each pseudo ID. ⊕ is an Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation.
Here, P and Ppub1 are the public parameters preloaded by the TA. After the encryption, IDi1
and IDi2 are delivered to the private key generation module.
Private key generation module: In this module, identity-based cryptography [44] is em-
ployed. Since a pseudo identity has two parts (i.e., IDi1 and ID
i
2), the private key generation
module is responsible for computing a private key based on IDi1 and ID
i
2. Thus, the resul-
tant private key also contains two parts, which are denoted as SKi1 and SK
i
2, respectively. As
shown in Fig. 4.1, SKi1 and SK
i




1 | IDi2), respectively.
Finally, vehicle Vi can obtain a list of pseudo identities IDi=(IDi1, ID
i
2) along with the
corresponding private keys SKi=(SKi1, SK
i
2). Note that the pseudo identities and the private
keys can be generated offline by the tamper-proof device; thus, no delay will be caused in the
signing messages at the OBU side due to this process.
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4.3.3 Message Signing
When vehicles are traveling on the road, they periodically broadcast traffic related informa-
tion that could be extremely vital and life-critical information for neighboring vehicles. To
ensure the integrity of the messages, each message sent by a vehicle should be signed and
verified when being received. With the proposed IBV scheme, the message signing phase is
presented as follows.
1. A vehicle, denoted by Vi, first generates the traffic related message denoted by Mi.
2. Vi picks a pseudo identity IDi=(IDi1,ID
i
2) and the corresponding private key SKi=(SK
i
1,
SKi2) by way of the tamper-proof device.
3. With the private key SKi=(SKi1,SK
i
2), Vi can compute the signature σi of the message
Mi, where
σi = SKi1 +H(Mi)SK
i
2 .
4. Subsequently, Vi broadcasts the final message ⟨IDi,Mi, σi⟩ to its neighboring vehicles.
5. These steps are repeated every 100-300 ms according to the DSRC [1].
The signature of the proposed IBV scheme has the following merits. Firstly, the signature
overhead is very low. Compared with the ECDSA signature scheme of IEEE1609.2 [8],
which is the current standard for VANETs, the length of a signature in the IBV scheme is a
half of that of the ECDSA, e.g., |σi| = 225 bits ≈ 29 bytes.1 However, the IBV scheme does
not need any signature certificate to be sent along with the message due to the adoption of
identity-based cryptography; instead, only a short-length pseudo identity is sent, which is of
a length 58 bytes, i.e., |IDi| = |IDi1| + |IDi2| = 58 bytes. In contrast, the ECDSA scheme
1If IBV uses an MNT curve [61] with 224-bit q, where the bilinear map ê : G1 ×G2 → GT is asymmetric,
G1 ̸= G2, and elements in G1 are 224+1 bits long. The one extra bit indicates the coordinate (x-coordinate or
y-coordinate) of a point in an elliptic curve.
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has to incorporate a certificate in the message, which is 125 bytes long in the case of using
the certificate presented in IEEE 1609.2 Standard [8]. We will further compare our proposed
IBV scheme with the ECDSA scheme in terms of the communication overhead in Section V.
Secondly, from the perspective of signing speed, the proposed IBV scheme does not add
any extra signature generation delay compared with that in ECDSA, where both of them
need two multiplication operations on an elliptic curve. At last, the signature of the IBV
scheme does not leak any real identity information of the vehicle because a pseudo identity
is used in the scheme. Furthermore, since all the messages are signed with different pseudo
identities, thus none of the two messages can be connected to a single vehicle with the IBV
signature scheme, which is expected to successfully address the issue of privacy preservation
in VANETs.
4.3.4 Message Batch Verification
Based on the network architecture as described in Section II, once a vehicle receives traffic
related messages from other vehicles, the vehicle has to verify the signatures of the messages
to ensure that the corresponding vehicles are not attempting to impersonate any other legiti-
mate vehicles or disseminating bogus messages, which may result in tremendous impairment.
For ease of presentation, we first introduce the single signature verification process, followed
by the presentation on the batch verification of multiple signatures signed by distinct vehicles
on different messages.
Single signature verification: Given the system public parameters {G, GT , q, P , Ppub1,
Ppub2} assigned by the TA and the message ⟨IDi, Mi, σi⟩ sent by the vehicle Vi, the signature
σi is valid if ê(σi, P ) = ê(IDi1, Ppub1) · ê(H(Mi)h(IDi1 | IDi2), Ppub2),as verified below.
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= ê(SKi1, P )ê(H(Mi)SK
i
2, P )
= ê(s1IDi1, P )ê(H(Mi)s2h(ID
i
1 | IDi2), P )
= ê(IDi1, s1P )ê(H(Mi)h(ID
i
1 | IDi2), s2P )
= ê(IDi1, Ppub1)ê(H(Mi)h(ID
i
1 | IDi2), Ppub2)
Therefore, the computation cost by a vehicle for verifying a single signature is dominantly
comprised of three pairing operations, one multiplication, one MapToPoint hash [47]. Note
that the computation cost of a pairing operation is much higher than the cost of a multiplica-
tion and a MapToPoint hash operation.
Batch verification: Given n distinct messages denoted as ⟨ID1,M1, σ1⟩, ⟨ID2,M2, σ2⟩,
..., ⟨IDn,Mn, σn⟩, respectively, which are sent by n distinct vehicles denoted as V1, V2, ...,
Vn, all signatures, denoted as σ1, σ2, ..., σn, are valid if ê(
∑n










































































Thus, this batch verification can dramatically reduce the verification delay, particularly when
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verifying a large number of signatures. From the above batch verification equation, the com-
putation cost that a vehicle spends on verifying n signatures is comprised of 3 pairing, n
multiplication, n MapToPoint hash, 3n addition, and n one-way hash operations. Among
these operations, the pairing operation is relatively time consuming. However, the batch ver-
ification scheme uses the constant number (i.e., 3) of pairing operations regardless of the size
of the batch. Thus, the time for a vehicle to verify a large number of signatures sent by the
surrounding vehicles can be dramatically reduced, which can apparently reduce the message
loss ratio due to the potential bottleneck of signature verification for vehicles.
Another advantage of IBV is that it can aggregate multiple signatures as one signature.
This promising feature is not directly used in our safety related application, but it can be
used to multi-hop non-safety related applications [25] to reduce communication overhead
in VANETs. In our scheme, the aggregate signature is equal to
∑n
i=1 σi, given n distinct
signatures, σ1, σ2, ..., σn. Further more, compared with BLS [47], our scheme does not
require that n distinct messages have to be sent from the same sender.
4.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed batch verification scheme in terms of
the following three aspects: the message authentication, the user identity privacy preserva-
tion, and the traceability by the TA.
• Message authentication. The message authentication is one of the basic security re-
quirements in vehicular communications. In the proposed IBV scheme, the signature
σi = SKi1 +H(M)SK
i
2 is actually a one-time identity-based signature. Without know-
ing the private key SKi1 and SK
i
2, it is infeasible to forge a valid signature. Because of
the NP-hard computation complexity of Diffie-Hellman problem in G, it is difficult to




1, Ppub1, P , and h(ID
i
1 | IDi2). At the same
time, because σi = SKi1+H(M)SK
i
2 is a Diophantine equation, by only knowing σ and
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H(M), it is still difficult to get the private keys SKi1 and SK
i
2. Therefore, the one-time
identity-based signature is unforgeable, and the property of message authentication is
achieved.
• Identity privacy preserving. In the proposed scheme, the real identity RID of Vi is




1 = rP and ID
i
2 =
RID⊕H(rPpub) for unknown r. Note that the pseudo identity pair (IDi1, IDi2) is actually
an ElGamal-type ciphertext, which is semanticly secure under the chosen plaintext
attacks. Therefore, without knowing the master-key (s1, s2), it is infeasible for anyone
to tell the real identity from the pseudo identity pair. Also, the linkability does not
exist because the pseudo identities (IDi1, ID
i
2) in each signature instance is distinct.
Therefore, the identity privacy preservation can be guaranteed.
• Traceability. Given the pseudo identity pair IDi1 and IDi2, only the TA, given the master-
key (s1, s2), can trace the real identity of the vehicle by computing IDi2 ⊕H(s1IDi1) =
RID⊕H(rPpub)⊕H(s1rP ) = RID. Therefore, once a signature is in dispute, the TA
has the ability to trace the vehicle from the disputed message, in which the traceability
can be well satisfied.
4.5 False Signature Detection with Group Testing Technique
It is clear that the proposed batch verification scheme can significantly accelerate the overall
signature verification when no false signature exists. When an error was found during the
batch verification, the false signatures should be identified in the batch, and it can be simply
done by sequentially verifying each signature using a single batch verification algorithm.
However, sequential verification obviously causes long delay, particularly when an attacker
who attempts to ruin the batch verification periodically sends a few invalid signatures. Note
that an attacker can use invalid identities when sending each message in order to prevent the
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TA from tracing its real identity. To improve the efficiency of false signature identification,
this chapter investigates group testing techniques for this problem.
4.5.1 Employment of Group Testing Algorithm
The group testing technique, as presented in Chapter 4.2.6, was to find an efficient strategy to
combine blood samples in the World War II, aiming to identify positive blood samples with
as few number of tests as possible. In our application, the objective of group testing is to find
invalid signatures with the minimal number of batch verification.
The task of false signature identification from a batch containing at least one false sig-
nature (or termed a ”bad batch” in the following context) is formulated as a group testing
problem. The batch verification equation in Chapter 4.3.4 takes 3 pairings and n opera-
tions of H(M) · HID to verify n signatures. Each of H(M) · HID takes a MapToPoint hash
and a multiplication. It is worth noting that the MapToPoint hash and multiplication can be
pre-computed and stored in memory for reuse. Once a batch verification on n signatures is
launched, n operations of H(M) ·HID are performed. If later a batch verification on any sub-
set of the n signatures is needed, the MapToPoint hash and a multiplication on H(M) · HID
do not need to be computed again. In this case, only 3 pairing computations are needed for a
batch verification (test), and the time of testing the validity of multiple signatures is equal to
that of testing a single signature.
Many constructions for adaptive combinatorial group testing were reported in the litera-
ture. However, it is difficult to find an optimal algorithm of group testing for a general pur-
pose because the computational complexity of group testing has not been determined [62].
Adaptive group testing algorithms for finding invalid signatures were summarized in [63],
and can be generally divided into the following four types: individual testing, binary search,
generalized binary splitting (GBS) [62], Li’s s-stage [62]. For each algorithm, the number
of tests in the worse case is summarized in Table 4.1. Throughout this section, let n denote
the number of signatures to be verified in a batch, and d be the upper bound on the estimated
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number of invalid signatures.
Table 4.1: Different adaptive group testing algorithm comparison [63]
Algorithm Tests (worst case)
Individual Testing : n− 1
Binary Search : d⌈log(n)⌉
















)⌉ and elog(e) ·d · log(
n
d
). Moreover, the optimal algorithm depends on the
values of n and d. Nevertheless, it is convenient to analyze the values of the above functions
when a parameter (i.e., d) changes and the other parameter (i.e., n) is fixed. Fig. 4.2 shows
the number of required tests (batch verifications) as d changes and n is fixed. In Fig. 4.2(a)-
(d), n is equal to 100, 200, 300, and 400 respectively. It is clear that the function of Li’s
s-stage and the function of GBS always meet at a certain point, as represented as Point 1 in
Fig. 4.2. When d is less than the x coordinate1 of Point 1, GBS always has the optimal (min-
imal) function value. In addition, the function of Li’s s-stage and the function of Individual
testing always meet at another point that is represented as Point 2. When d is less than Point
1 and larger than Point 2, Li’s s-stage always has the optimal function value. When d is larger
than Point 2, the Individual testing always has the optimal function value.
In Fig. 4.2, n is only set to four values, i.e., 100, 200, 300, 400. For better analyzing the
relationship between Point 1 (Point 2) and n, more value of n are selected. Given each n,
the values of Point 1 and Point 2 are computed, as they are computed in Fig. 4.2(a)-(d). As
such, a set of values of Point 1 and Point 2 can be obtained. Fig. 4.3(a) shows the set of the
1To ease our presentation, Point 1 and Point 2 respectively represent the x coordinate of Point 1 and x
coordinate of Point 2 throughout this paper.
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Figure 4.2: Show the number of tests required changing as increasing the upper bound on the
number of invalid signatures (d) in four scenarios, where the number of signatures (n) equals
100, 200, 300, and 400, respectively.
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values of Point 1 and Point 2 given different values of n. As we can see, Point 1 and Point 2
increase linearly as n increases. Thus, it is reasonable to use two linear functions to represent
the Point 1 set and Point 2 set. Fig. 4.3(b) shows the two fitting functions: the function
y1 = 0.17n+1.31 fits the Point 1 set; the function y2 = 0.34n+0.44 fits the Point 2 set. The
two lines divide the plane of Fig. 4.3(b) into three areas. Each area represents a desired group
testing algorithm to be used. Therefore, given n and d, an optimal group testing algorithm
can be selected. For example, given n = 200 and d = 10, the point (200,10) is in the Area
3 in Fig. 4.3(b). In this case, GBS is the optimal group testing algorithm. Given n = 300
and d = 60, the point (300,60) is in the Area 2 in Fig. 4.3(b). In this case, Li’s s-stage is the
optimal group testing algorithm. Given n = 100 and d = 60, the point (100,60) is in the Area
1 in Fig. 4.3(b). In this case, the Individual testing is the optimal group testing algorithm.
The more generalized solution to choose the optimal algorithm is given below in accordance
with the values of d and n.
GBS, d ≤ 0.17n+ 1.31
Li’s s-stage, 0.34n+ 0.44 ≥ d > 0.17n+ 1.31
Individual testing, d > 0.34n+ 0.44
4.5.2 Generalized Binary Splitting
For batch verification, an attacker needs to send only a few number (at least one) of invalid
signatures to launch a DoS attack that makes normal vehicles do group testing to find invalid
signatures. In this case, the value of d that has been analyzed in the previous section is small.
From the analysis in the previous section, we know that when d is small, GBS is the optimal
group testing algorithm.
The GBS algorithm [62] is adopted in our scheme and presented in Algorithm 1. To use
Algorithm 1, we need to estimate d, the upper bound on the number of invalid signatures.
In VANETs, vehicles send the traffic related messages every 300 ms. In a normal case,
the number of signatures that vehicles receive every 300 ms is equal to the number of their
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(a) Show the values of Point 1 (Point 2) under different values of n






































Area 1: Individual testing 
Area 2: Li’s s−stage 







(b) Show the functions to fit the samples of Point 1 and Point 2
Figure 4.3: Show that the value sets of Point 1, Point 2 and the corresponding fitting func-
tions. 62
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Algorithm 1: Generalized binary splitting algorithm
Input: n signatures, where the estimated number of invalid signatures is not more
than d
Result: Find out all invalid signatures
if n ≤ 2d− 2 then1
a vehicle tests the n items individually;2
the group testing is done and return.3
else4
compute l = n− d+ 1, and α = ⌊log(l/d)⌋.5
end6
Test a group of size 2α signatures.7
if the outcome is negative then8
the group of 2α signatures are identified as good.9
set n = n− 2α, and go to Step 1.10
else11
use binary search to identify 1 invalid signature, and an unspecified number, say12
m, of valid signatures.
set n = n− 1−m, d = d− 1, and go to Step 1.13
end14
neighbors, which can assist in estimating d. Such an estimating work belongs to a category of
intrusion detection, and many related work [64, 65] has been conducted. For example, based
on a number of ds in previous time periods, a Markov chain [66] can be used to compute the
distribution of d and estimate d in the upcoming time period. We adopt the existing solution,
and estimating d is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the IBV scheme in terms of verification delay
and transmission overhead. Since the proposed scheme focuses on the signature verification
process for V2V, we only consider the V2V communication in this section. In the following
evaluation, we assume all the vehicles can communicate directly with each other’s commu-
nication range.
4.6.1 Verification Delay
We define and compute the time cost of the cryptographic operations required in each verifi-
cation by the proposed IBV scheme. Let Tmul denote the time to perform one point multipli-
cation over an elliptic curve, Tpar denote the time to perform a pairing operation, Tmtp denote
the time to perform a MapToPoint hash function, Tinv denote the time to perform an inverse
operation in a finite field, and Thash denote the time to perform a hash function, e.g., SHA-1.
Since Tmul and Tpar dominate the speed of a signature verification, we only consider these
operations and neglect other operations such as hash and inverse operations. We adopt the
experiment in [67], which observes processing time for an MNT curve [61] of embedding
degree k = 6 and 160-bit q, running on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine. The following
results are obtained: Tmul is 0.6 ms and Tpar is 4.5 ms.
Next, we compare the proposed IBV scheme with ECDSA and BLS in terms of the veri-
fication delay. Here, the ECDSA scheme is the signature algorithm adopted by IEEE1609.2
standard [8], while BLS is a short signature scheme, which can also be used to perform sig-
nature aggregation. Table 4.2 shows the combination of the dominant operations of the three
signature schemes in terms of verifying a single signature and n signatures, respectively.
From the batch verification equation in Section III-V, we observe that the time to verify n
distinct signatures is 3Tpar + nTmtp + nTmul. According to [69], with BLS, the time spent
on verifying n signatures is equal to (n + 1)Tpar + nTmtp. Verifying a ECDSA signature
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requires 2Tmul + Tinv. Note that using Shamir’s trick [59] to compute 2Tmul can be calculated
faster than two point multiplications. Particularly, according to [70], 2Tmul can be reduced to
1.2Tmul. Thus, verifying a ECDSA signature requires 1.2Tmul + Tinv, and verifying distinct
n signatures requires 1.2nTmul + nTinv. Since ECDSA and BLS are not identity-based sig-
nature schemes, additional operations are needed to verify the public key’s certificate. Thus,
the overall message verification time for ECDSA and BLS should be doubled2 as shown in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Comparisons of the speed of different verification schemes (ms)
Verify a single signature Verify n signatures
IBV : 3Tpar + Tmtp + Tmul 3Tpar + nTmtp + nTmul
BLS : 4Tpar + 2Tmtp (2n+ 2)Tpar + 2nTmtp
ECDSA : 2.4Tmul + 2Tinv 2.4nTmul + 2nTinv
RAISE : 1.2Tmul + Tinv + Thash 1.2Tmul + Tinv + nThash
In our analysis, we assume the communication coverage of a vehicle is 300 m, and each
vehicle periodically broadcasts a traffic related message every 300 ms. The traffic density is
taken as the number (#) of vehicles within a vehicle’s radiation range. The traffic density is
also taken as the number of signatures to be verified in 300 ms. Since RAISE is an RSU-aided
verification scheme, it is not in the same category with IBV, ECDSA, and BLS. Thus, here
we only compare the performance by using IBV, ECDSA, and BLS to verify the signatures.
Fig. 4.4 shows the relationship between the verification delay and the number of vehicles
within a certain vehicle’s radiation range. The embedded small figure is a local zoom-in with
the traffic load ranging from 12 to 20. From Fig. 4.4, we can observe that the verification
delay by using BLS is always the largest no matter how many messages are received by
2With the IBV scheme, each message sent by a vehicle corresponds to a distinct identity. Thus, to achieve
the same privacy level as the IBV’s, the vehicle using the public key based schemes also needs to change an
identity for each sending message. That is the reason why verification time for ECDSA and BLS should be
doubled in this section.
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Figure 4.4: Verification delay vs. Traffic density
a vehicle. Another interesting result is that when the number of messages received within
300 ms is smaller than 16, the ECDSA scheme achieves the smallest message verification
latency; however, when the number of messages is greater than 16, the IBV scheme yields
much less verification latency. Clearly, when the traffic density is high, the IBV scheme can
verify the largest number of signatures, which is observed to achieve the lowest message loss
ratio when the traffic load increases.
We compare the message verification delay of these three schemes in terms of the ratio
of the verification delays as shown in Fig. 4.5. We can see that the delay ratio between
IBV and ECDSA approaches to a constant, which is approximately 0.651 when the number
of messages in one interval is greater than 40. The delay ratio between IBV and BLS is
approximately 0.112 when the number of messages is larger than 20. In other words, the
speed of IBV is 34.9% faster than that of ECDSA, and is 88.8% faster than that of BLS.
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Figure 4.5: Verification delay ratio vs. Traffic density
4.6.2 Expected Verification Delay with False Signatures
In the previous section, the verification delay is evaluated in the situation where no false
signature exists in each batch. In this section we will further analyze the verification delay
where false signatures exist in a batch.
If the batch verification of IBV fails, the GBS group testing approach is used to find
invalid signatures. In this case, more verification delay would occur. To properly quantify
this delay, we define two probabilities. Let q denote the probability that a signature is invalid,
and p denote the probability that a batch of n signatures has at least one invalid signature.
Clearly, p also denotes the probability that a DoS attack happens, while 1 − p denotes the
probability that no DoS attack happens. The relationship between p and q is presented below.
p = 1− (1− q)n, and q = 1− (1− p)1/n. (4.1)
Let TIBV denote the verification delay that IBV is used to perform batch verification on
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IBV without invalid signatures
ECDSA
IBV with p =0.60
IBV with p =0.50
IBV with p =0.20
IBV with p =0.10
Figure 4.6: Expected verification delay vs. Traffic density
n signatures. As presented in Table 4.2, TIBV = 3Tpar + nTmtp + nTmul. Let TGBS denote
the delay that the GBS group testing approach is used to find invalid signatures. As shown





)⌉) · 3Tpar, where d = n · q. Using the above
parameters, we can derive the expected verification delay of IBV. We use EIBV to denote the
total expected verification delay, which is derived as below.
EIBV
= TIBV · (1− p) + (TIBV + TGBS) · p
= TIBV + TGBS · p





)⌉) · 3Tpar · p






)⌉} · 3Tpar · p
(4.2)
Fig. 4.6 shows the relationship between EIBV with different values of p and the number
of vehicles (signatures) in a vehicle’s communication range. From Fig. 4.6, we can observe
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that given a fixed number of vehicles (signatures) EIBV increases as p increases, but the
increasing amount is not significant. If p is a small value, for example p = 10%, EIBV is
close to the verification delay when there is no DoS attack. Compared with ECDSA, IBV
with a large p still yields a lower expected verification delay especially in the scenario where
the traffic density is high. As shown in Fig. 4.6, if the probability (p) that DoS happens
equals to 50%, the IBV has lower verification delay than ECDSA has when the number of
vehicles (signatures) is greater than 55. It is worth noticing that in reality the probability that
DoS happens is far less than 50%. Therefore, we conclude that IBV is able to achieve low
verification delay even though the DoS attack is taken into consideration.
4.6.3 Transmission Overhead
In this section, we compare the transmission overhead of IBV, ECDSA and BLS. The com-
parison is in terms of the following two aspects: the transmission overhead in V2V communi-
cation and the overhead in non-safety application. Here, the transmission overhead includes
a signature and a certificate appended to the original message, while the message itself is not
counted.
Table 4.3: Comparisons of transmission overhead of three schemes (ms)
Send a single message Send n messages
IBV : 29+58 bytes 29+58n bytes
BLS : 29+125 bytes 29+125n bytes
ECDSA : 56+125 bytes 56n+125n bytes
If an elliptic curve with 224-bit q is used, the length of a signature for IBV and BLS is
29 bytes, and the length for ECDSA is 56 bytes. When we use BLS or ECDSA, a certificate
must be transmitted along with a signature. If we use the certificate presented in IEEE 1609.2
Standard [8], which has 125 bytes in length, the total transmission overhead of the BLS
and ECDSA scheme is 29+125 bytes and 56+125 bytes, respectively, as shown in Table
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Figure 4.7: Transmission overhead vs. the number of messages received by a vehicle
4.3. Since the proposed IBV scheme is based on identity-based cryptography, only a short
pseudo identity with 58 bytes is transmitted along with the original message. Thus, the total
transmission overhead of IBV is 29+58 bytes as shown in Table 4.3.
Fig. 4.7 shows the relationship between the transmission overhead and the number of
messages received by a vehicle. Clearly, as the number of messages increases, the trans-
mission overhead increases linearly. The transmission overheads of ECDSA is the largest
among the three schemes, and the transmission overhead of the IBV is much smaller than
the other two. We can further observe that the transmission overhead of the IBV scheme
is 56.5 percent of that of BLS and 48.1 percent of that of ECDSA. On the other hand, as
shown in Fig. 4.7, within the observation window of 1 minute, when the number of messages
increases up to 30000, IBV saves 1.92 Mbytes and 2.69 Mbytes of bandwidth compared with
BLS and ECDSA, respectively. Here, 30000 corresponds to the number of messages sent by
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Figure 4.8: Transmission overhead vs. the number of aggregate signatures
150 vehicles in 1 minute.
In a delay and forwarding application [25], a non-safety related application in VANETs,
vehicles in nature are commuters traveling in/among cities, and thus they can easily be used
to carry, transmit, and forward messages. On the other hand, RSUs in nature are message
switches which can be used to buffer messages and send messages to vehicles. For example,
a message is to be sent from a location A to another location B through VANETs. The
message is first carried by a vehicle driving from A towards B, and forwarded to an RSU
before the vehicle drives away from the direction of B. Then, the RSU buffers the messages
and forwards them to another vehicle that is driving towards the direction B. As such, the
messages are repeatedly buffered, forwarded, and finally transmitted to B.
IBV can also be used in the delay and forwarding application for signature aggregation
to reduce the communication overhead, which is another merit of IBV and should be em-
phasized here. In the delay and forwarding application, a vehicle assisting in forwarding
71
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications
messages could aggregate multiple signatures. With IBV, given n distinct signatures, σ1, σ2,
..., σn, the aggregate signature is equal to
∑n
i=1 σi. It is worth noticing that unlike BLS, IBV
does not require that n distinct messages have to be sent from the same sender. We compare
the transmission overhead due to signature aggregation with the overhead without signature
aggregation.
As shown in Table 4.3, let an RSU send n distinct signatures to a vehicle for forwarding.
With the ECDSA scheme, the transmission overhead is in proportion to the number of sig-
natures, namely (56+125)n bytes. In contrast, since BLS and IBV can aggregate signatures,
only one aggregate signature is sent. In addition to the signatures, the BLS scheme needs to
transmit a certificate with the length of 125 bytes for each message, while the IBV only needs
to transmit a pseudo identity with the length of 58 bytes for each message. Thus, the total
transmission overhead is 29+125n and 29+58n for the BLS and IBV, respectively. Fig. 4.8
shows the comparisons. The transmission overhead of all the schemes is proportional to the
number of aggregate signatures. Compared with ECDSA, BLS is subject to lower transmis-
sion overhead; nonetheless, the advantage gained in BLS is not obvious because the certifi-
cate dominates the length of the overhead. On the other hand, since no certificate for each
message is required in IBV, the advantage gained in the proposed scheme is obvious. From
Fig. 4.8, we can see the transmission overhead of the IBV scheme is 46.4 percent of that by
BLS and only 32.0 percent of that by ECDSA.
4.7 Summary
We have proposed a novel Identity-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme for V2V commu-
nications in VANETs, which has been identified to be capable of meeting the most important
and emerging design requirements on security and privacy preservation ever reported in the
literatures. First, the proposed IBV scheme can significantly improve the system perfor-
mance by fully taking advantages of verifying multiple message signatures at once instead of
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the verification in a one-by-one manner. Second, the scheme has also addressed the identity
privacy and traceability issues in vehicular networks, where the signature of a message is
signed according to a pseudo identity pair and private keys that are generated by the tamper-
proof device. Third, the IBV scheme enables TA to retrieve the real identity of a vehicle from
any message signature, such that conditional privacy preservation can be achieved. Fourth,
the scheme adopts group testing technique, which can efficiently to find invalid signatures
from a batch of signatures. Finally, extensive analysis and evaluation have been conducted
to demonstrate that the IBV scheme can achieve excellent operational efficiency for vehicu-
lar communications in terms of signature verification delay and communication overhead, in
comparison with existing counterparts.
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Chapter 5
Mitigating Signature Jamming Attacks
against Message Authentication
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, efficient message authentication schemes have been introduced to
address security-related scalability issues in VANETs. With the proposed schemes, vehicles
can verify traffic related messages in a fast way. Nevertheless, in our previous chapters, the
normal case is only considered, where vehicles verify regular messages sent by legitimate
vehicles, but the abnormal situation is not considered, where a sophisticated attacker may
launch a denial of service (DoS) attack deliberately.
Attempting to launch a DoS attack, an attacker may send a significant number of mes-
sages with invalid digital signatures. In this case, the security units of the surrounding vehi-
cles will be occupied by the extensive computation effort in verifying those invalid messages,
which results in delay in verifying the other regular and legitimate messages. Since the ve-
hicles cannot accept messages before these messages pass through the signature verification,
such a delay further leads to loss of the legitimate messages. Particularly, with ECDSA for
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example, a vehicle spends 3.87 ms1 to process a single signature verification, a vehicle can
verify about 70-80 messages in a 300 ms broadcasting cycle. Even using IBV, a vehicle can
verify about 250-300 messages in a 300 ms broadcasting cycle. Attackers can easily crash
the network when they massively floods messages with invalid signatures (e.g., the number
of invalid signatures is far larger than 300) as a DoS attack. We specifically term such a DoS
attack as Signature Jamming Attack (SJA). It is worth noticing that attackers launching a SJA
could use false identities in order to prevent a TA from tracing their real identities. At this
point, this fact increases the difficulty for us to thwart SJA.
The SJA falls in the category of DoS attacks. It is clear that studies on DoS have been
conducted in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and IEEE 802.11 based access networks
[71–75]. Ning et al. [71] proposed a lightweight authentication scheme using cryptographic
puzzles. Wang et al. [72] introduced a dynamic window scheme, in which each individual
sensor makes a smart decision on whether to verify or forward signatures. The right choice
can mitigate DoS attacks. Dong et al. [74] integrated the approaches of an authentication
filter and cryptographic puzzles to address the DoS attack. Nevertheless, the characteristics
of wireless sensor networks and conventional IEEE 802.11 access networks are different
from those of vehicular networks. For example, a VANET has no limited power constraint,
and it is generally hard for an attacker to compromise security materials in a vehicle. In
addition, vehicles are more dynamic and mobile than sensors. Moreover, an important feature
in VANETs is that the time interval of sending messages is fixed, which equals 300 ms. Due
to these unique features, the above schemes in WSNs and 802.11 access networks cannot
directly apply to VANETs. To thwart SJA, the TESLA [30] scheme for vehicular networks
could be an alternative countermeasure to prevent vehicles from verifying a large number of
invalid signatures. However, the TESLA scheme brings verification delay at a receiver side.
Such a delay is unsuitable for safety-related applications in VANETs.
1The 224 bits ECDSA cryptographic delays are quoted from MIRACL cryptographic lib with the 3GHz
Pentium IV system.
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Motivated by the above observations, this chapter investigates an efficient countermea-
sure to the SJA. A novel puzzle-based scheme is proposed, which equips each vehicle with
an authentication filter. With the proposed scheme, vehicles can exclude messages with in-
valid signatures in the pre-authentication stage with very low overhead before messages go
into the regular signature verification process. The proposed signature filer is characterized
by being free from any real-time verification delay at both sender and receiver sides, and can
achieve the best scalability in presence of massive massages of false signatures. To achieve
the best filtering effect, a hash recommendation mechanism is employed, which enables be-
nign vehicles to associate with each other and cooperatively defend the SJA.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 5.2 briefly introduces the pre-
liminaries including our system model, attack model, hash chain, RSA encryption, and the
puzzling mechanisms. Chapter 5.3 presents a puzzle-based message authentication scheme.
Chapter 5.4 introduces the proposed hash recommendation mechanism to solidify the puzzle-
based scheme. Chapter 5.5 analyzes the performance of the proposed schemes through ex-
tensive experiments and simulations. Finally, the summary is given in Chapter 5.6.
5.2 Systems and Security Preliminaries
5.2.1 System Model
We consider a VANET where each vehicle periodically broadcasts traffic related messages
to its one-hop neighbors. The message broadcast period is 300 ms in accordance with
DSRC [1]. The local time on each vehicle is synchronized as introduced in [71, 76]. Ve-
hicles communicate with each other based on IEEE 802.11p protocol, and they have the
same communication range. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is adopted, where each vehicle
has a public/private key pair and the corresponding PKC. Without loss of generality, vehi-
cles could have multiple public/private key pairs [12] or could use identity based signature
scheme for any specific reason and design premise, which, nevertheless, is transparent to the
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design of our scheme in this chapter.
5.2.2 Attack Model
In general, there are two types of attacks on a cryptosystem: passive attack and active attack.
For a passive attack, an attacker cannot interact with any of the parties involved, while just
attempting to break the system by observing and analyzing data. For an active attack, an
attacker attempts to break security by altering or adding information communicated between
parties. We considers the active attack in this chapter, where the attacker is sitting among
vehicles and attempts to send a large number of bogus messages with invalid signatures.
The purpose of the attacker is to delay normal message verification of the other vehicles by
flooding messages with invalid signatures. The attacker could be either stationary or moving,
and could be a normal vehicle with its own private key and public key. In order to escape
from being traced by the trust authority, the attacker that launches the SJA does not use its
own public key to expose its real identity.
SJA is different from a pure Dummy Message Jamming Attack (DMJA). Attackers us-
ing DMJA attempt to occupy the whole wireless bandwidth and interfere normal message
transmission. The number of sent messages in DMJA is far larger than the number of sent
messages in SJA. Therefore, SJA is a weaker attack compared with DMJA.
5.2.3 Design Objective
Our design objective in this chapter is to provide countermeasure of the SJA in the message
authentication process for vehicular communications. Specifically, based on the aforemen-
tioned attack model, we have the following design objectives.
• Mitigation of SJA: It is well-known that DoS is notorious and extremely hard to prevent.
Due to the nature of DoS, the damage caused by the SJA cannot be 100% avoided.
Nonetheless, our objective is to mitigate the damage capability of SJA as much as
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possible.
• Minimized authentication delay: Safety-related traffic messages sometimes bear criti-
cal information and cannot be delay and/or dropped.
• Authenticity: It is to ensure that the received messages are indeed sent from original
message senders.
• Integrity: It is to guarantee that an attacker in the middle cannot modify or pollute
messages and the corresponding authentication credentials, e.g., signatures.
5.2.4 Hash Chain
Hash chain [77] in an essential cryptography approach for network security in many applica-
tions. It is widely used for secure password authentication [79], system micropayment [79],
stream data authentication [80], and secure data forwarding [30]. The computation of a hash
chain is based on a one-way hash function. Let H(.) denote a one-way hash function, where
it is easy to compute H(m) given a message m with an arbitrary length, but hard to derive m
given H(m). The generation of a hash chain is shown Fig. 5.1.
hr-1hr h0h1
HHHH
The seed of the hash chain, h0, h1,…, hr
The commitment of the hash chain, h0, h1,…, hr
hr
h0
Figure 5.1: A one way hash Chain
First of all, we select is a random number s, and let hr = s. Then, we compute hi =
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H(hi+1), i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , r − 1. h0 is called tip or commitment of the hash chain. One
can apply the above hash chain by revealing the chain elements in the opposite order. Hash
chain has the following properties: (1) given x, it is computationally hard to find y ̸= x
such that H(x) = H(y); (2) it is computationally hard to find a pair of messages, x and
y, such that H(x) = H(y); (3) given hi, it is easy to compute hi−1, but given hi−1, it is
computationally hard to find hi, i = 1, ..., r. Since the one way hash chain has extremely
low computation overhead, recently it has been widely used for the design of many security
protocols in wireless networks.
5.2.5 Hash-based Puzzle
A puzzle is a question that needs to take some time to solve. Ning et al. [71] introduced a
hash-based puzzle scheme to mitigate DoS in wireless sensor network. A hash-based puzzle
is based on computation of a hash function. Since the hardness of reverse computation of a
hash function is determined by the length of the hash, the length of the hash determines the
security of a hash function. Under the computation ability of state-of-the-art computers, a
hash function with a length of 160 bits, such as SHA-1, could be generally taken as secure
enough to defend a brute force attack. On the other hand, a hash with a shorter length can
be more easily computed in the reverse direction. With the above knowledge, a hash-based
puzzle scheme can be described as follows:
H(Q | S) = 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
where “00..0” presents l bits of ”0”, and “xx...x” presents any bit pattern. l is set in the range
of 20-26 [71], which is much shorter than 160 bits as that taken by SHA-1 [58]. Q is called
puzzle. Thus, given the puzzle Q, the solution to the puzzle is S such that H(Q | S) satisfies
the above pre-defined bit pattern. The computation time to solve a puzzle depends on the
value of l.
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5.3 Puzzle-based Message Authentication Scheme
5.3.1 Overview
Filter verification is a process of pre-authentication performed before signature verification,
which is light-weight and must be faster than a regular signature verification process. The
proposed pre-authentication mechanism can be incorporated with any PKI based signature
scheme, while the study of PKI-based signature schemes is not in the scope of this chapter.
With the existing signature schemes for VANETs, a message has a common abstract for-
mat: ⟨m | σ | Cert⟩, where m is the message, σ is the signature on the message, and Cert is
the PKC. In the event that the ID-based signature is employed, Cert can be omitted. As pre-
sented at the beginning of this chapter, the existing signature schemes cannot countermeasure
the vicious effect due to SJA, which motivates the endeavor of the study in this chapter.
m Cert m CertF
Figure 5.2: A new message format
To thwart SJA, the proposed signature scheme has one more parameter added to each
message, thus the message format is ⟨m | F | σ | Cert⟩, as shown in Fig. 5.2. The parameter
F is called signature jamming attack filter. With the proposed scheme, a vehicle that receives
the message ⟨m | F | σ | Cert⟩ first verifies the filter F . If F is valid, the vehicle further
follows the regular signature verification process to check σ. Otherwise, if F is invalid, the
vehicle drops the message directly and hence no signature σ verification is needed. When the
vehicle does not have enough information to verify F , it uses the public key in Cert to verify
σ. The filter F should be light-weighted such that the verification of F should be very fast.
Therefore, such F can be used to quickly filter invalid messages at the first authentication
step.
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5.3.2 Core of proposed pre-authentication scheme
Although the idea of using a hash-based puzzle mechanism has been explored in [71] for
wireless sensor networks, it is not suitable for VANETs due to the following two factors.
First, VANETs have a highly dynamic network topology. Second, message verification for
VANETs should not bring any delay at either sender side or receiver side. This chapter
proposes a novel puzzle-based scheme that will be perfectly working in a highly dynamic
environment of VANETs.
The sender off-line generates a hash chain h0, h1, . . . , hr, wherein hi = H(hi+1), i =
0, 1, 2, . . . r − 1, hr = s is a random number, and r is the length of the hash chain. In our
scheme, each element of a hash chain is orderly attached with a message to be sent. The first
sent message, denoted by m0, and its credentials are presented as follows,
ID | m0 | 0 | h0 | {H(ID | m0 | 0 | h0)}sk | Certpk.
where ⟨0 | h0⟩ is the filter F , and {H(ID | m0 | 0 | h0)}sk is the signature σ. Here, {m}sk rep-
resents signing m with the private key sk. ID, sk, and Certpk denotes the sender’s identity,
private key, and PKC, respectively. As mentioned before, the proposed pre-authentication
mechanism can incorporate any state-of-the-art PKI signature scheme, such as RSA, ECDSA,
and IBV. Following the message is the index of the hash chain, where 0 denotes the first ele-
ment of the used hash chain. We call the first message including h0 as commitment message
in the following context.
On the recipient side, the vehicle that receives the message first computes H(ID | m0 | 0 |
h0), and then verifies the signature {H(ID | m0 | 0 | h0)}sk with the sender’s public key pk.
If the signature is valid, the vehicle buffers ID, 0 and h0, which will be used to authenticate
the upcoming messages with the identity ID.
Compared with the first message, the subsequent messages at the sender have different
contents as shown below.
⟨ID | mi | i | hi | S | σ | Certpk⟩, i = 1, 2, . . . , r,
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where ⟨i | hi | S⟩ is the filter F , and σ equals {H(ID | mi | i | hi | S)}sk. For any message,
ID | mi | i | hi | S, i ̸= 0, it must satisfy the following format.
H(ID | mi | i | hi | S) = 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
Given mi, the sender needs to compute S, which is the solution to the puzzle with the above
format. hi is the i-th element of the previously used hash chain, and is also called the key
to the puzzle. In VANETs, the standard [1] requires each message to be sent every 300 ms,
and thereby i | hi is sent every 300 ms accompanying with mi as shown in Fig. 5.3. In our
scheme, mi includes the sending timestamp ti.
300 ms
. . .
m0,h0 m1,h1 m2,h2 mn,hnmn-1,hn-1
time
t0 t1 t2 tn-1 tn
300 ms 300 ms
Figure 5.3: Each key is sent every 300 ms
Upon receiving ID | mi | i | hi | S, the receiver first verifies the puzzle key hi. Since
the previous key hi−1 (i > 0) associated with ID has been buffered, the receiver can verify
hi−1
?
= H(hi). If the receiver does not have hi−1 but has hj (0 ≤ j < i−1)2, it can still verify
hi by checking hj
?
= H(i−j)(hi), where H(i)(m) = H(H(i−1)(m)) and H(1)(m) = H(m). If
the key hi is invalid, the receiver just drops the message due to the fact that only the sender
with hj can know hi. If the key hi is valid, the receiver further verifies the solution S, which
is valid one if H(ID | mi | i | hi | S) can satisfy the predefined bit format: l bits 0 followed
by 160− l bits “x” (x=1 or 0), if SHA1 is used. Here we called l as the secure length of the
proposed filter.
2If the receiver still does not have hj , it has to verify σ. A valid σ means a valid hi. However, verifying σ
is subject to SJA. We leave the solution introduction in Chapter 5.4.
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Figure 5.4: An example of the man in the middle attack
In addition to the above verification steps, mi is dropped if the sending time ti does not
equal tj + 300 × (i − j), where tj is the timestamp in the previously received message mj .
Note that j is equal to i− 1 if the receiver did not lose the previous message from the sender.
If ti equals tj + 300 × (i − j), the receiver further verifies whether the time difference δ
between the sending time ti and the instant time t that mi is received is less than a threshold,
denoted by ∆.
By manipulating the threshold ∆ and the secure length l, we can mitigate the threat of
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. In our scheme we make the threshold ∆ equal 100 ms.
We define the length of l such that the time on calculating the solution S to a puzzle is much
larger than ∆. Suppose an attacker attempting to tamper with mi in the middle as shown
in Fig. 5.4. The attacker must compute a new solution S ′i to the puzzle after he receives
ID | mi | i | hi | S. As such, the attacker has to spend more than ∆ to get S ′i. However,
while the receiver receives this forged message m′i and S
′
i, they will find out that the time
difference δ = t − ti is larger than ∆. Note that the attacker cannot modify ti because
the DSRC standard defines the sending time interval as 300 ms as shown in Fig. 5.3 and
the local time on each vehicle is synchronized [71, 76]. As long as the receiver verifies mi
that contains the timestamp ti, the receiver thus can predict the timestamps in the following
received messages. Therefore, our scheme is secure against the MITM attack.
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In a word, the proposed puzzle-based signature filter scheme can achieve a fast pre-
authentication process, which needs only a few hash operations at the sender and receiver.
Moreover, unlike the TESLA related scheme which is based on delayed authentication, with
our scheme a receiver can verify each message immediately when it is received.
5.3.3 Offline Speedup Mechanism at Sender
Although the proposed puzzle-based filter scheme can effectively achieve desired fast pre-
authentication, it brings delay at the sender side due to the computation of a puzzle solution
S, which may take more than ∆. Since the calculation of S can be performed only when
message m is ready, thus additional delay is incurred in sending each message. To reduce
the delay, one approach is to shorten the secure length l so that the latency on computing S
becomes shorter. Nonetheless, this is at the expense of weakened security protection where
an adversary can compute S more quickly.
To deal with the aforementioned problem, we introduce a novel approach as an offline
speedup mechanism to incorporate with the proposed puzzle-based filter scheme. Our design
is motivated by the observation that the computation of the puzzle solution S should be kept
independent of the message m such that the delay of computing S can be performed offline,
wherein the delay at the sender can be completely removed. Our approach is characterized
by using an RSA encryption mechanism with a small public key as presented in the following
paragraphs.
Algorithm 2 presents the process of the authentication credential generation. Similar to
the original pre-authentication scheme, a hash chain is first pre-generated, and each mes-
sage orderly uses one hash chain element. In Step 2, the RSA encryption parameters are
pre-defined. The message sender has its own secret parameters, denoted as p and q. The
parameter n is a public parameter with a small length. Note that the RSA encryption does
not require a strong security level, which will be further discussed in Chapter 5.5. In Step 3,
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Algorithm 2: Filter Generation
Input: a message mi, the element index of a hash chain i
Result: ⟨ID | m | i | hi | A | B | C | D⟩
Generate a hash chain h0, h1, . . . , hr, such as hi = H(hi+1), i = 0, 1, . . . r − 1, and1
hr = s, where s is a random number.
Choose two distinct large prime numbers p and q, and compute n = p · q and2
φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1). Let e be equal to 3. Compute d such that e · d = 1 mod φ(n).
d is a secure key and only known by the sender. Let ID = n.
Find a puzzle solution S ∈ Z∗n, where3
Z∗n = {a is an integer, a ∈ [0, n] | gcd(a, n) = 1}, such that
H(hi | S) = 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
Compute Sd and save the tuple ⟨i, hi, S, Sd⟩ in local database. Step 1-4 are done4
off-line.
Given a message m, find a, b ∈ Z∗n, i.e., a is coprime to n, such that5
a ·Hn(m) + b = Sd mod n, where Hn(.) is a hash function mapping {0, 1}∗ to an
integer in [0, n]. a, b can be found in the following two steps. (i) Randomly select a
number a ∈ Z∗n, i.e., a is coprime to n, and a ̸= 1; (ii) Compute b = Sd − a ·Hn(m)
mod n.
Compute A = a3 mod n, B = b3 mod n, C = 3a2b mod n, D = 3ab2 mod n such that6
A+B + C +D = a3 + b3 + 3a2b+ 3ab2 = (a+ b)3 mod n.
Output ⟨ID | m | i | hi | A | B | C | D⟩.7
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the message sender pre-computes the puzzle solution S such that
H(hi | S) = 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
Having the solution S, each vehicle also needs to pre-compute Sd mod n, which is used
in Step 5 directly. Since this process is completely independent of the message, it can be
performed offline. When a message m is generated, the sender vehicle finds a, b ∈ Z∗n,
a is coprime to n such that a · Hn(m) + b = Sd mod n, where Hn(.) is a hash function
mapping {0, 1}∗ to an integer in [0, n]. a, b can be found in the following two steps. (i)
Select a number a ∈ Z∗n, a is coprime to n, and a ̸= 1; (ii) Compute b = Sd − a · Hn(m)
mod n. Then, vehicles compute a3 mod n, b3 mod n, 3a2b mod n, 3ab2 mod n. For clarity
of presentation, let A = a3 mod n, B = b3 mod n, C = 3a2b mod n, and D = 3ab2
mod n. Notice that a3 + b3 + 3a2b + 3ab2 = (a + b)3 mod n. Finally, vehicles broadcast
the tuple ⟨ID | m | i | hi | A | B | C | D | σ | Certpk⟩ to their neighbor, where
⟨i | hi | A | B | C | D⟩ is the filter F , and σ equals {H(ID | mi | i | hi | A | B | C | D)}sk.
With the above, the process of a filter generation can be done in a very efficient way since
no delay at the sender side is caused due to the offline computation of each puzzle solution.
The computation of A,B,C,D in Step 6 of Algorithm 2 only needs a few multiplication
operations, and the computation time can be negligible especially when n is small.
Algorithm 3 presents the process of filter verification. Upon receiving the filter F = ⟨ID |
m | i | hi | A | B | C | D⟩, the receiver verifies hi and the timestamp within m. This process
is exactly the same as the original filter design. If this step succeeds, the receiver compute
S = AHn(m)
3 +B + CHn(m)
2 +DHn(m). This equation holds because
S = Sφ(n) = Se·d = S3·d mod n
= (Sd)3mod n = (aHn(m) + b)3 mod n
= a3Hn(m)
3 + b3 + 3a2bHn(m)
2 + 3ab2Hn(m) mod n
= AHn(m)
3 +B + CHn(m)
2 +DHn(m) mod n.
Once the receiver has the puzzle solution S and the key hi, it verifies whether H(hi | S)
has the predefined format as shown in Step 3 of Algorithm 3. If this step succeeds, the
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Algorithm 3: Filter Verification
Input: ⟨ID | m | i | hi | A | B | C | D⟩
Result: 1, accepted; 0, denied
Verify ti in mi. If ti ̸= tj + 300 · (i− j) ms, where tj (0 ≤ j < i) is previously1
received in mj , then return 0;
Verify hj
?
= H(i−j)(hi), where hj (0 ≤ j < i) is previously received. If the equation2
does not hold, then return 0;
Let n = ID. Compute S = A ·Hn(m)3 +B + C ·Hn(m)2 +D ·Hn(m) mod n.3
Verify whether the following equation holds4
H(hi | S)
?
= 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
If the above equation does not hold, return 0;
Verify whether 9 · A ·B ?= C ·D mod n. If the equation holds, then return 1, and 05
otherwise.
receiver further verifies whether 9·A·B ?= C ·D mod n. This requirement ensures the security
of our scheme by preventing an attacker from forging a bogus message m′. Appendix A gives
the proof. If the verification of any step above fails, the receiver just drops the message m.
It is clear that the process of pre-authentication credential verification is as fast as the
credential generation. To verify a message, the receiver only needs to do two hash operations
and seven multiplication operations. We leave our scheme’s performance analysis in Chapter
5.5.
5.3.4 Security Analysis
An attacker attempting to generate a bogus m has the following approaches: forging a puzzle
key hi, computing another puzzle solution S ′, or compromising a secure key d. Our puzzle-
based filter scheme along with the offline speedup mechanism is secure against all these
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attempts.
• Forging a puzzle key hi: Our scheme uses a one-way hash chain as the puzzle key. An
attacker cannot forge hi based on previous hash elements hj (0 < j < i) because it
is computationally hard to derive hi given hj . An attacker can compute hi only if it
knows hk (k > i), which is nonetheless released 300 ms later. Here, the security of
using one-way hash chain is the same as that of TESLA.
• Computing a new puzzle solution S ′: An attacker could attempt to compute a new
puzzle solution S ′ such that H(hi|S ′) has the predefined format, which is defined in
Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Further, the attacker can forge m′, A′, B′, C ′, D′ such that
S ′ = A′ ·Hn(m′)3 +B′ + C ′ ·Hn(m′)2 +D′ ·Hn(m′) mod n. However, the attacker
can start to compute S ′ only after he receives the puzzle key hi. In our scheme, we
have a length of l for the key which is long enough such that the computation time for
a puzzle solution is far larger than ∆. In this way, after the attacker forges m′ and S ′,
the expected arriving time of m has passed and the expected message authentication
time is also expired.
• Compromising a secure key d: If an attacker compromises the secret key d, he will be
able to forge a message m′ easily. Suppose an attacker knows d, he can compute a+b in
Algorithm 2 because a+b = (a+b)3d = (A+B+C+D)d mod n. He can also compute
aHn(m)+b because aHn(m)+b = Sd and further compute a, b. Then, the attacker can
forge new m′, a′, b′, A′, B′, C ′, D′ such that a′Hn(m′)+ b′ = aHn(m)+ b = Sd mod n
and S = A′ ·Hn(m′)3+B′+C ′ ·Hn(m′)2+D′ ·Hn(m′) mod n. As such, the attacker
forges the message m′ without modifying S and Sd. Fortunately, in our scheme only
a message sender knows the secret parameter d. To compromise d, the attacker has to
factorize a large prime n, which equals to p · q. Therefore at this point, the security
of our scheme is the same as that of large integer factorization. Actually, choosing
a relatively small n such that an attacker cannot factorize it within ∆ is sufficient to
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make our scheme secure. Note that it is useless for an attacker to spend more than ∆
to factorize n and compute d because the expected time for the receiver to verify m′ is
expired. Chapter 5.5 will further discuss the security in our scheme by using a small n.
In addition, Appendix B proves that attackers cannot forge m′ when only m, a, b, Sd
are given.
5.4 Hash Recommendation
Under the proposed scheme, a vehicle can verify the filter of any received message only if it
has the corresponding puzzle key, which is either h0 in ⟨ID | m0 | 0 | h0 | σ0 | Certpk⟩, or hi
in ⟨ID | mi | i | hi | A | B | C | D | σi | Certpk⟩. However, a vehicle does not always have
a puzzle key that is associated to a certain sender. For example, in Fig. 5.5(a) scenario I, va
and vc are not in each other’s communication range; on the other hand in Fig. 5.5(b) scenario
II, va and vc are in each other’s communication range while vc overtakes va. At this moment,
va has not verified vehicle vc’s puzzle key yet, and thus va cannot verify vc’s filter. As such,
an intuitive solution is that va verifies the signature in vc’s message so as to obtain vc’s puzzle
key, by which va can verify the filters in vc’s subsequent messages. However, as long as va
verifies a message first via its signature, this simply opens a door for the SJA to occur.
To enable a vehicle v to verify a received message first via a filter instead of a signature, a
recommendation mechanism is introduced to make v aware of the authentication credential of
another vehicle before the vehicle enters the communication range of v. With the credential,
v can go through the filter instead of signature verification to authenticate messages from
the vehicle. For example in Fig. 5.5(a) scenario I, before vc comes into the communication
range of va, the proposed recommendation mechanism enable va to receive credential of vc
such that vc’s messages can be verified via a filter. Therefore, at the moment of the scenario
II in Fig. 5.5(b), va can verify the filter of any vc’s message before verifying its signature to
mitigate the threat of SJA.
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(a) senario I (b) senario II
Figure 5.5: An example of traffic scenarios
5.4.1 Credential Exchange in Hash Recommendation
Let us review the message format and understand what serves as credentials in the message
authentication. There are two types of messages launched by a vehicle. One is commitment
message that contains the commitment h0 of a hash chain with a format ⟨ID | m0 | 0 | h0 |
σ0 | Certpk⟩; while the other is common messages with a format ⟨ID | mi | i | hi | A | B |
C | D | σi | Certpk⟩, where hi with i ≥ 0 is a puzzle key. Verifying a puzzle key hi needs
either hi−1, hi−2, · · · , or h0. As long as a vehicle vb verifies hj sent by vehicle va where
0 ≤ j < i, vb can thus verify the subsequent messages of va containing hi, i > j. Here, hj
can be taken as the authentication credential. The newest released hash element of va’s hash
chain: h0, h1, . . . , hr, is denoted as hA, and hA = hi if va has released i + 1 (i < n) hash
elements in the chain, which are h0, h1, . . . , hi. To differentiate vehicles’ IDs and facilitate
finding the index of hi in a hash chain, hA is also called a recommendation hash of the
vehicle and hA = ⟨IDA | i | hi⟩. Note that a recommendation hash ⟨IDA | i | hi⟩ serves as a
practical presentation of authentication credential and is contained in any common message
⟨ID | mi | i | hi | A | B | C | D | σi | Certpk⟩.
In our recommendation mechanism, each vehicle sends an outgoing message along with
k (or less than k) recommendation hashes according to Algorithm 4. Let mi contain k rec-
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Algorithm 4: Recommendation hash selection
Input: β IDs whose corresponding messages have been verified
Result: Broadcast k recommendation hashes
Suppose that a vehicle has α neighbors at a time shot, and has already verified β1
(β < α) vehicles’ messages. Then, the vehicle has β recommendation hashes, each of
which corresponds to a neighbor. The set of such β recommendation hashes is called a
recommendation set. Note that the size of a recommendation set is dynamically
changeable.
If a vehicle receives a new recommendation hash from another vehicle, the vehicle2
inserts the newly obtained recommendation hash into its local recommendation set.
Here, a vehicle can newly obtain a recommendation hash if the vehicle successfully
verifies a commitment message and abstracts its recommendation hashes from the
message.
If a recommendation hash is not in use for a while, the recommendation hash is3
deleted form the set. In other words, the hashes in the recommendation set are updated
according to their freshness.
Let N denote the size of the recommendation set of vehicle v, and k be a threshold on4
the number of recommendation hashes. When v sends a periodic message, the
message is attached with k selected recommendation hashes from the local
recommendation set. If N < k, k = N .
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ommendation hashes, hA, hB . . ., up to the number of k, and each recommendation hash
represents a vehicle whose previous filter has been verified by the message sender. Once
receiving a new recommendation hash, a vehicle saves it to their recommendation set defined
in Algorithm 4 and uses it to verify the upcoming messages that have the same ID as that in
the received recommendation hash. As such, each recommendation hash works as a recom-
mendation ”letter” for a particular vehicle, and the exchange of the ”letters” constructs the
desired trust-relationship network among the benign vehicles.
An example is given by using Fig. 5.5(a) scenario I. va and vc are in the communication
range of vb. Suppose vb has verified va’s and vc’s messages, and va and vc have verified vb’s
messages. Hence, vb has hA and hC , and both va and vc have hB. Since va is not in the
communication range of vc, hence, va does not have hC , and vc does not have hA. After
vc overtakes vb, as shown in Fig. 5.5(b) scenario II, vc is in the communication range of
va. Since va and vc do not have each other’s recommendation hash, va and vc cannot verify
each other’s filter. However, with our proposed recommendation mechanism in Fig. 5.5(a)
scenario I, vb has sent the recommendation hashes hA and hC along with its message such
that va and vc can obtain hC and hA, respectively. In this way, va and vc can verify their
filters each other. Such a recommendation mechanism takes advantage of the Inter-Vehicle
Communication (IVC) in the VANETs, and the more densely connected a network is, the
better our scheme performs.
Note that recommendation hashes sent by an attacker cannot be accepted because a rec-
ommendation hash is a part of the message content, where a vehicle only accepts a message
after the message’s filter and signature are successfully verified. In order to make a legitimate
vehicle to believe a fake recommendation hash, the attacker has to sign a message and then
reveals its public key and identity. This is out of the scope of our attack model in the sense
that an attacker does not intend to reveal his identity to the public. In addition, our mech-
anism requires the priority to verify a common message higher than that for a commitment
message. Here, a vehicle could receive a message which has its recommendation hash either
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Figure 5.6: An example scenario of defending SJA on a new joining vehicle
already verified or not yet verified. Our scheme designates a higher priority of verification on
a message with an already verified recommendation hash. As such, an attacker who attempts
to launch SJA cannot delay vehicles to verify the common messages whose recommendation
hashes have been disseminated. On the other hand, an attacker could just launch an attack
at a certain area which does not affect the whole network. Therefore, as long as a legitimate
vehicle verifies a commitment message or a signature in a common message, the legitimate
vehicle could recommend the sender’s hash to other vehicles. Then, other vehicles can verify
the sender filter in the subsequent common messages.
Fig. 5.6 exemplifies a scenario of SJA on vehicle va that newly joins the VANET. An
attacker sends invalid signatures in its communications range (or referred to as its attack
zone shown in Fig. 5.6). Since vb has already had vc’s recommendation hash, the attacker
cannot prevent vb from verifying vc’s messages. Further since vb in the attack zone might not
have a chance to verify va’s signatures, it cannot verify va’s recommendation hash hA. In the
event that vc is outside of the attack zone of the attacker, vc can verify va’s signature and hA
by sending the recommendation hash hA to vb. Once vb has hA, vb can forward hA to other
vehicles so that hA is known in the entire attack zone. As such, vb is able to verify the newly
joined vehicle va’s filters. In addition, the time (hop) to life of a hash recommendation is
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restricted to a small number (e.g. five hops to live) so as to the recommendation mechanism
not only avoids high communication overhead but also prevents a recommendation hash
being stored at a vehicle for a long time. The life time of a hash chain in our scheme could
be several minutes or tens of minutes. Before a vehicle changes to use a new hash chain, it
can recommend itself to others.
5.5 Performance Analysis
5.5.1 Authentication Delay
The authentication delay caused by filter generation and verification is evaluated in this sub-
chapter.
Filter generation is a puzzle generation process. With the proposed offline speedup mech-
anism presented in Chapter 5.3.3, it needs to find a puzzle solution S ∈ Z∗n, such that
H(hi | S) = 00...0︸ ︷︷ ︸
l bits
xx...x.
In the subchapter an experiment is conducted on the puzzle generation time with different
lengths of l, Windows CryptoAPI [81] is employed to compute MD5 and SHA1 hashes on
a computer with a 1.5 GHz Intel(R) M processor and 1.5 GB DDR RAM. The experiment
examines the computation time of solving a puzzle with a different number of l’s changed
from 1 to 22, and 100 puzzle solutions are found to get the average computation time for
each case of a specific number of l’s. The result is shown in Fig. 5.7, which clearly shows
that the mean time to find a puzzle exponentially increases as l increases. Since the puzzle
solution generation in our scheme does not depend on the message itself, the puzzle solution
can be found off-line, thereby subject to minimal sending delay compared with that in [71].
Filter verification shown in Algorithm 3 takes a number of hashes for calculating S. Since
the hash computation can be performed in an extremely short time, we only need to discuss
the computation delay for S: S = A ·Hn(m)3+B+C ·Hn(m)2+D ·Hn(m) mod n, which
94
Chapter 5. Mitigating Signature Jamming Attacks against Message Authentication
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22




















Figure 5.7: The mean time to generate a puzzle solution vs. the length of l
takes 5 multiplications, as well as the verification of 9 · A · B ?= C ·D mod n, which takes
2 multiplications. Thus, the time on the 7 multiplications can also be negligible even if n is
1024-bit long. Note that a strong security level is not required since a filter is used for a local
and instant pre-authentication purpose.
Table 5.1: Comparisons of the verification delay in different schemes







Without receiver-side delay :
√ √
×
Another issue is that n can be reused for a number of transmissions but needs to be
updated time from time. In case it takes m seconds to successfully factor n, using n in
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Figure 5.8: The factorization time vs. the length of an integer
the proposed pre-authentication mechanism can ensure security for m seconds right after
n is being used for the first time. Thus, vehicles should update to get a new n less than
every m seconds. To clearly observe the factorization time with distinct lengths of n, a
simple experiment is conducted again by using the computer with a 1.5 GHz Intel(R) M
processor and 1.5 GB DDR RAM, where an integer is factorized using the Basic and Fermat
methods [82], respectively. Fig. 5.8 shows that the factorization time exponentially increases
as the integer length increases, and a 64-bit n takes more than 100 seconds for factorization.
We also verify the time of performing 7 multiplications with 64-bit n, which is 2.5546×10−5
ms and is negligible to the calculation of S. In our work, we recommend using 128-bit n
to ensure a longer update period and a more reliable pre-authentication mechanism, while
without losing the computation simplicity. Table 5.1 gives a comparison of verification delay
in different schemes. Compared with TESLA and the puzzle scheme in [71], our proposed
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Figure 5.9: A city map with span of 1.5 kilometers
scheme produces neither authentication delay at receiver nor delay at the sender, which can
better serve for real-time and dynamic applications such as VANETs.
5.5.2 Verification Percentage
With the proposed hash recommendation scheme to thwart SJA, vehicles need to first verify
a filter in a message. To verify a filter, vehicles need to have recommendation hashes of
its neighbors. Let α denote the number of neighbors that a vehicle v has, and β denote the
number of the neighbors that vehicle v already has their recommendation hashes. Hence, the
vehicle v is able to verify β out of α neighbors’ messages. Here β/α is termed Verification
Percentage (VP), which is desired to be large for better performance.
A simulation is conducted to examine VP under different traffic scenarios and different
parameter selection as shown in Fig. 5.10-Fig. 5.13. A city map [76] is used with 9 roads and
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Figure 5.10: Verification percentage is observed in terms of different probability (p)
a span of 1.5 kilometers as shown in Fig. 5.9. On each road vehicles are initially uniformly
allocated and move in both directions, either towards west (north) or east (south). At an
intersection, a vehicle randomly selects one of possible directions and continue to move.
When a vehicle runs out of the city, a new vehicle is generated. The density of vehicles (i.e.,
distance in meter per vehicle) ranges from 10 to 40, the driving speed ranges from 40 km/h to
100 km/h, and the communication range of each vehicle is 200 meters. The period of sending
a recommendation hash message is 0.5 seconds. The number (denoted by k in Algorithm 4)
of recommendation hashes within a message ranges from 1 to 8. The simulation duration is
10 minutes.
Let p denote the probability that a vehicle initially has a neighbor’s recommendation
hash. It is clear that a larger p leads to more scalable verification. On the other hand, p
also represents the percentage of the number of valid signatures that a newly joined vehicle
receives. Given a vehicle’s verification ability, a vehicle can verify N signatures in 300 ms.
98
Chapter 5. Mitigating Signature Jamming Attacks against Message Authentication


























Figure 5.11: Verification percentage is observed in terms of different sending recommenda-
tion hash number
However, only about p·N signatures are valid, and (1−p)·N signatures are invalid. Fig. 5.10
shows how VP responds when p is 10%, 20%, 30%, and 80%, respectively. From Fig. 5.10,
we can see that when p is as low as 10%, our hash recommendation scheme can still achieve
78% of VP, and almost 100% VP can be achieved when p is equal to 80%.
Given p equals 30%, we evaluate how VP is affected when different numbers of recom-
mendation hashes are sent per 0.5 seconds. Let num denote the number of recommendation
hashes sent per 0.5 seconds. From Fig. 5.11, we can see that VP is near 80% in average
when num equals 1, and it is increased when num is increased. When num equals 2, VP
is equal to 97% in average. However, when num goes even larger, our scheme cannot be
benefitted much. This implies that our scheme can achieve high VP without taking much
communication overhead.
In Fig. 5.12, we observe whether the driving speed effects VP when num = 4. In our
99
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications


























Figure 5.12: Verification percentage is observed in terms of different driving speed
simulation, each vehicle has a baseline driving speed on top of a uniformly random offset
ranging from −5 km/h to 5 km/h. In Fig. 5.12, the three curves represent that the baseline
driving speeds of vehicles are respectively equal to 40 km/h, 50 km/h, and 100 km/h. From
Fig. 5.12, we can see that the driving speed has little effect on VP.
In Fig. 5.13, we change the number of vehicles in our simulation to observe how the
traffic density affects VP. The four curves in Fig. 5.13 respectively represent the densities:
the inter-vehicle distances are respectively 10m, 20m, 30m, and 40m. Clearly, VP decreases
as the traffic density decreases. However, even when the inter-vehicle distance increases to
40m, our scheme can still achieve about 80% of VP.
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Figure 5.13: Verification percentage is observed in terms of different recommendation hash
sending interval
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have investigated a possible attack in VANETs, called Signature Jamming
Attack (SJA), that could seriously affect the functions of VANETs. To thwart SJA, we have
proposed an enhanced hash-based puzzle scheme which can be perfectly fitted into the highly
dynamic environment of VANETs. To fully explore the ad hoc characteristic of VANETs,
we have introduced a hash recommendation mechanism, with which legitimate vehicles can
share their information so as to effectively support the proposed hash-based puzzle scheme.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed schemes, we have conducted extensive exper-
iments and showed that our proposed scheme does not produce verification delay at either
a sender side or a receiver side. Moreover, through extensive simulations we have demon-
strated that our scheme can achieve high verification percentage in distinct traffic scenarios
101
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications




Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, the contributions of this thesis are concluded, and followed by the future
work.
6.1 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Firstly, an RSU-aided message authentication scheme, called RAISE, is introduced.
RAISE taking advantage of the assistance of RSUs makes a vehicle fast verify its
neighboring vehicles messages, and thus reduce message authentication delay. Com-
pared with traditional PKI-based message authentication protocols for security and
privacy, the computation cost and communication overhead of RAISE are significantly
reduced. In addition, RAISE can also achieve conditional privacy preservation. RAISE
is capable to trace the real identity of a malicious vehicle when the vehicle abuses its
behavior.
• Secondly, considering the situation of absence of RSUs in certain areas, we further
proposed an efficient ID-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme for message authen-
tication in VANETs. IBV work as a supplementary approach to RAISE, and does not
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needs the assistance of RSUs. IBV is capable to make vehicles verify a batch of signa-
tures once in stead of using the approach in a one-by-one verifying manner. Hence the
average authentication delay on a batch of signatures can be reduced. In addition, IBV
can still achieve the same security and conditional privacy requirements as RAISE.
To find invalid signatures in a batch of signatures, group testing technique is adopted,
which can find invalid signatures efficiently.
• Thirdly, a denial of service attack against message authentication in VANETs is intro-
duced. Such an attack is termed Signature Jamming Attack (SJA), which could delay
benign vehicles to verify legitimate messages. To thwart SJA, we proposed an authen-
tication filter mechanism, with which vehicles are able to exclude invalid signatures in
the pre-authentication stage before they process the normal signature verification. Our
proposed filter scheme has very low verification overhead. It does not produce any real
time verification delay at an sender side or at an receiver side.
6.2 Future Work
Our research has made a notable progress on achieving secure message authentication in
VANETs. Yet, addressing security and privacy issues is still a very wide-open field, and
there are several research directions to be explored to complement our efforts.
6.2.1 Conditional Privacy Preservation in Different Directions
In this thesis, we have discussed and worked on the conditional privacy preservation in a
vertical direction, where vehicles are anonymous to each other but their real identities are
transparent to a trusted third party, such as TA.
However, in reality, conditional privacy in VANETs needs to be protected in different
directions. In some cases, a vehicle would like to expose its identity and location in a certain
location or an area. For example, a group of friends drive several cars, and travel in a city
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that is strange to them. To real-time trace each other’s locations, they may take advantage of
VANETs to share vehicle’s identities and locations. However, after finishing this trip, they no
longer wish to expose their identities and locations for others. In this example, the condition
of privacy is regarding to location and time. Particularly, vehicles would like to expose their
identities and locations in a certain time period. To the best of our knowledge, this conditional
privacy related issues have not been properly and completely solved yet. Thus, conditional
privacy protection in different directions is a future work for us to explore.
6.2.2 Incentive in Non-safety Related Applications
In this thesis, we have proposed efficient message authentication schemes for safety related
applications in VANETs. However, for non-safety related applications, there are many secu-
rity issues that have not been well addressed.
For non-safety related applications, for example in a vehicle-based delay tolerant net-
work, vehicles could be used to forward and deliver digital information. A vehicle is treated
as a free information carrier. However, in reality, vehicles could refuse to provide the service
due to non-profit. As such, we have to design an efficient incentive mechanism and effec-
tively stimulate vehicles to forward messages. However, designing an efficient incentive
mechanism is challenging because we have to properly consider and answer the following
questions. First, what kind of value (e.g., money, gas coupon, or virtual reputation) could be
used as the profit in an incentive mechanism? The value must interest all drivers/vehicles.
Otherwise, some vehicles that are not interested in the value could still deny forwarding mes-
sages for others. Second, how much value should be given to a package forwarder? Third,
how do vehicles redeem the value? and where do vehicles redeem the value? The location
for redeem should be easy for vehicle to find. Fourth, how do we thwart replay attacks and
collusion attacks? Since some attackers can collude together, and forward the same package
circularly and repeatedly in order to gain more profit. Fifth, how do we guarantee the fairness
in an incentive system? We need to guarantee that a vehicle must gain its profit after it for-
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wards data for others. From the above mentioned issues, we can clearly see that designing an
efficient incentive mechanism for VANETs is challenging. Yet, so far existing reported work
has not completely solved these issues. Therefore, the designing work on incentive mech-
anism for non-safety related applications in VANETs still needs exploration in our future
research.
In conclusion, because of these unresolved research challenges, we will continue to work
on these challenges in the future. We will also consider other latest research progresses such
as secure and efficient certificate revocation and study the security issues related to them.
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Proof of Filter Unforgeability
In this appendix, we prove that it is computationally hard for attackers to forge m′, A′, B′, C ′,
D′ when given m,A,B,C,D and S, where S,A,B,C,D are subject to S = A ·Hn(m)3 +
B + C ·Hn(m)2 +D ·Hn(m) mod n and 9 · A · B = C ·D mod n. Before we proof this,
first we review the quadratic residuosity problem. Let n be a composite number n that is the
product of distinct large prime numbers p and q. Suppose there exists t such that t2 = a mod
n, and a and n are given. If p and q are given, it is easy to compute t. Otherwise, if p and q
are unknown, it is hard to compute t.
To forge A′, B′, C ′, D′, attackers must make them satisfy A′ · B′ = C ′ · D′ mod n.
Attackers select two random numbers in Z∗n as A′, B′, and compute X = A′B′ mod n. If
attackers attempts to forge m′, they have to compute C ′ that is subject the following two
equations. D′ = X/C ′ mod n (1)S = A′ ·Hn(m′)3 +B′ + C ′ ·Hn(m′)2 +D′ ·Hn(m′) mod n (2)
Equation (1) and (2) can merge together to Equation (3) as shown below.
Hn(m
′)2 · C ′2 + (A′ ·Hn(m′)3 +B′ − S)C ′ +XHn(m′) = 0 mod n (3)
Equation (3) is a quadratic equation. Hn(m′)
2 is the coefficient of C ′2. Computing C ′ is
107
On Achieving Secure Message Authentication for Vehicular Communications
a quadratic residuosity problem. As we presented before, it is hard to compute C ′ without
knowing the factorization of n.
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Proof of Message Unforgeability
In this appendix, we prove that given m, a, b and Sd, which are subject to aHn(m) + b =
Sd mod n, it is computationally hard for attackers without knowing the factorization of n to
forge m′ such that aHn(m′) + b = Sd mod n, where a, b, Sd ∈ Z∗n, i.e., a, b, Sd are coprime
to n, Hn(.) is a hash function mapping {0, 1}∗ to an integer in [0, n]. aHn(m) + b = Sd mod n (1)aHn(m′) + b = Sd mod n (2)
Suppose attackers can find m′ such that aHn(m′)+b = Sd mod n, and then we have two
equations, (1) and (2), presented above. We compute Equation (1) minus Equation (2), and
have Equation (3).
a(Hn(m)−Hn(m′)) = 0 mod n (3)
From Equation (3), we can see that there exists an integer k, such that a(Hn(m) −
Hn(m
′)) = kn. Due to a is coprime to n, there exists an integer k′ = k/a. Then we
have Hn(m)−Hn(m′) = k′n. Hn(m′) can thereby be presented below.
Hn(m
′) = Hn(m)− k′n (4)
In Equation (4), k′ can be any integer, i.e., k′ = ...,−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, .... However, the
values of Hn(m) and Hn(m′) must be two integers in [0, n]. If k = 0, Hn(m′) = Hn(m).
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In this case, Hn(m′) is not a forgery. If k ̸= 0, Hn(m′) cannot be in the range of [0, n].
Therefore, Hn(m) cannot be forged.
As such, the only way for attackers to forge m′ is to find m′ such that Hn(m′) = Hn(m).
The security level to forge m′ is equivalent to the security level to break a hash function.
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